{ "api_version": "1", "kind": "dse_post", "self": "https://update.dsesecurity.com/api/v1/posts/exempt-defender-for-identity-sensor-traffic-from-ssl-interception/", "item": { "id": "https://update.dsesecurity.com/updates/exempt-defender-for-identity-sensor-traffic-from-ssl-interception/", "slug": "exempt-defender-for-identity-sensor-traffic-from-ssl-interception", "url": "https://update.dsesecurity.com/updates/exempt-defender-for-identity-sensor-traffic-from-ssl-interception/", "alternate_urls": { "markdown": "https://update.dsesecurity.com/updates/exempt-defender-for-identity-sensor-traffic-from-ssl-interception.md", "json": "https://update.dsesecurity.com/api/v1/posts/exempt-defender-for-identity-sensor-traffic-from-ssl-interception/" }, "title": "Exempt Defender for Identity sensor traffic from SSL interception", "summary": "Use Connect to the Defender for Identity service to review this narrow operational decision without extending the source beyond its stated scope.", "format": { "slug": "briefing", "name": "Briefing" }, "priority": { "slug": "advisory", "name": "Advisory" }, "featured": false, "image": { "theme": "identity-cloud", "label": "Identity & cloud", "alt": "Governed cloud identity system with connected service and lifecycle nodes.", "card_url": "https://update.dsesecurity.com/assets/editorial/identity-cloud-card.webp?v=1.8.20", "hero_url": "https://update.dsesecurity.com/assets/editorial/identity-cloud-hero.webp?v=1.8.20", "social_url": "https://update.dsesecurity.com/assets/editorial/identity-cloud-social-v2.jpg?v=1.8.20", "width": 2400, "height": 1350 }, "topics": [ { "slug": "cybersecurity", "name": "Cybersecurity", "url": "https://update.dsesecurity.com/topic/cybersecurity/" }, { "slug": "it", "name": "IT", "url": "https://update.dsesecurity.com/topic/it/" }, { "slug": "microsoft-365-identity", "name": "Microsoft 365 & Identity", "url": "https://update.dsesecurity.com/topic/microsoft-365-identity/" } ], "author": { "name": "DSE Security Editorial Team", "url": "https://update.dsesecurity.com/#editorial-team", "type": "Organization" }, "publisher": { "name": "Detection Systems & Engineering", "url": "https://dsesecurity.com/" }, "published_at": "2026-08-27T12:13:35+00:00", "modified_at": "2026-08-27T13:01:31+00:00", "reviewed_on": "2026-08-26", "reading_minutes": 3, "word_count": 521, "potentially_affected": "Teams, systems, services, or facilities within the stated scope of Connect to the Defender for Identity service", "dse_recommendation": "Compare the observed state with the cited official source, document applicability and exceptions, and test any approved change with rollback safeguards.", "primary_source": { "name": "Connect to the Defender for Identity service", "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-for-identity/deploy/configure-proxy", "published_on": "2026-07-02", "authority": "Microsoft Learn" }, "publishing_principles": "https://update.dsesecurity.com/updates/dse-updates-editorial-methodology/", "usage_info": "https://update.dsesecurity.com/usage/", "copyright_notice": "Copyright © 2026 Detection Systems & Engineering. All rights reserved.", "content_html": "

Use this document to resolve one bounded operational decision: Exempt Defender for Identity sensor traffic from SSL interception. Only the official source and traced locations below supply facts. Confirm applicability before acting.

\n

Source fact:

\n

The official Connect to the Defender for Identity service from Microsoft supports the following bounded statements:

\n\n

Do not import neighboring assumptions into the source record. The supported task is a scoped comparison involving Defender for Identity workspaces, sensors, directory-service accounts, action accounts, network paths, roles, and deployment health and the conditions the source actually describes.

\n

What the source does not establish

\n

Allow only the documented service destinations and validate change controls; this source does not define an organization-wide proxy bypass policy. It does not establish a deployment’s current state, authorize a production change, prove compliance, or show that Active Directory, Windows DNS, time, certificates, domain-controller resources, network capture, cloud connectivity, and security operations are healthy. Documented options are review inputs, not universal mandates.

\n

Applicability questions

\n\n

DSE recommendation:

\n

DSE recommends using the cited source as the evidence anchor for this decision. Use a two-person review for the source interpretation and the resulting operational decision. Record the source location, examined part of Defender for Identity workspaces, sensors, directory-service accounts, action accounts, network paths, roles, and deployment health, observed and expected states, owner, and reason for deviation.

\n

For an approved change, define prerequisites, a limited test path, success and stop conditions, monitoring, and rollback. Check Active Directory, Windows DNS, time, certificates, domain-controller resources, network capture, cloud connectivity, and security operations in design order. Protect credentials, keys, recovery material, personal data, and sensitive topology in evidence.

\n

Verification and evidence

\n

Build a reproducible chain from Opening overview; Proxy and authentication explanation to the observed environment. Useful domain evidence includes sensor inventory, service and action-account permissions, health alerts, connectivity tests, portal state, and controlled detection tests; label every item with scope, timestamp, collector, and stable identifier.

\n

Retain the starting state, authorization, execution record, outcome, deviation, and final state as one review package. Move disruptive checks to an approved test path. Reopen the decision when versions, design, dependencies, ownership, or official guidance changes.

\n

Official references

\n", "content_text": "Use this document to resolve one bounded operational decision: Exempt Defender for Identity sensor traffic from SSL interception. Only the official source and traced locations below supply facts. Confirm applicability before acting.\nSource fact:\nThe official Connect to the Defender for Identity service from Microsoft supports the following bounded statements:\n\nEach Defender for Identity sensor requires internet connectivity to the cloud service to report data and operate. The research record locates this support at Opening overview.\nSSL inspection and intercepting proxies are unsupported because they interfere with certificate-based mutual authentication; proxy traffic must pass to required service URLs without interception. The research record locates this support at Proxy and authentication explanation.\n\nDo not import neighboring assumptions into the source record. The supported task is a scoped comparison involving Defender for Identity workspaces, sensors, directory-service accounts, action accounts, network paths, roles, and deployment health and the conditions the source actually describes.\nWhat the source does not establish\nAllow only the documented service destinations and validate change controls; this source does not define an organization-wide proxy bypass policy. It does not establish a deployment’s current state, authorize a production change, prove compliance, or show that Active Directory, Windows DNS, time, certificates, domain-controller resources, network capture, cloud connectivity, and security operations are healthy. Documented options are review inputs, not universal mandates.\nApplicability questions\n\nFor source statement 1 at Opening overview, which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?\nFor source statement 2 at Proxy and authentication explanation, which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?\nWhich deployed instance of Defender for Identity workspaces, sensors, directory-service accounts, action accounts, network paths, roles, and deployment health will be compared with the source, and why that instance?\nHow will the review distinguish a source mismatch from a failure in Active Directory, Windows DNS, time, certificates, domain-controller resources, network capture, cloud connectivity, and security operations?\nWho approves the conclusion, exception, test window, and rollback threshold?\n\nDSE recommendation:\nDSE recommends using the cited source as the evidence anchor for this decision. Use a two-person review for the source interpretation and the resulting operational decision. Record the source location, examined part of Defender for Identity workspaces, sensors, directory-service accounts, action accounts, network paths, roles, and deployment health, observed and expected states, owner, and reason for deviation.\nFor an approved change, define prerequisites, a limited test path, success and stop conditions, monitoring, and rollback. Check Active Directory, Windows DNS, time, certificates, domain-controller resources, network capture, cloud connectivity, and security operations in design order. Protect credentials, keys, recovery material, personal data, and sensitive topology in evidence.\nVerification and evidence\nBuild a reproducible chain from Opening overview; Proxy and authentication explanation to the observed environment. Useful domain evidence includes sensor inventory, service and action-account permissions, health alerts, connectivity tests, portal state, and controlled detection tests; label every item with scope, timestamp, collector, and stable identifier.\nRetain the starting state, authorization, execution record, outcome, deviation, and final state as one review package. Move disruptive checks to an approved test path. Reopen the decision when versions, design, dependencies, ownership, or official guidance changes.\nOfficial references\n\nConnect to the Defender for Identity service — Microsoft", "content_markdown": "Use this document to resolve one bounded operational decision: Exempt Defender for Identity sensor traffic from SSL interception. Only the official source and traced locations below supply facts. Confirm applicability before acting.\n\n## Source fact:\n\nThe official [Connect to the Defender for Identity service](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-for-identity/deploy/configure-proxy) from Microsoft supports the following bounded statements:\n\n- Each Defender for Identity sensor requires internet connectivity to the cloud service to report data and operate. The research record locates this support at Opening overview.\n\n- SSL inspection and intercepting proxies are unsupported because they interfere with certificate-based mutual authentication; proxy traffic must pass to required service URLs without interception. The research record locates this support at Proxy and authentication explanation.\n\nDo not import neighboring assumptions into the source record. The supported task is a scoped comparison involving Defender for Identity workspaces, sensors, directory-service accounts, action accounts, network paths, roles, and deployment health and the conditions the source actually describes.\n\n## What the source does not establish\n\nAllow only the documented service destinations and validate change controls; this source does not define an organization-wide proxy bypass policy. It does not establish a deployment’s current state, authorize a production change, prove compliance, or show that Active Directory, Windows DNS, time, certificates, domain-controller resources, network capture, cloud connectivity, and security operations are healthy. Documented options are review inputs, not universal mandates.\n\n## Applicability questions\n\n- For source statement 1 at Opening overview, which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?\n\n- For source statement 2 at Proxy and authentication explanation, which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?\n\n- Which deployed instance of Defender for Identity workspaces, sensors, directory-service accounts, action accounts, network paths, roles, and deployment health will be compared with the source, and why that instance?\n\n- How will the review distinguish a source mismatch from a failure in Active Directory, Windows DNS, time, certificates, domain-controller resources, network capture, cloud connectivity, and security operations?\n\n- Who approves the conclusion, exception, test window, and rollback threshold?\n\n## DSE recommendation:\n\nDSE recommends using the cited source as the evidence anchor for this decision. Use a two-person review for the source interpretation and the resulting operational decision. Record the source location, examined part of Defender for Identity workspaces, sensors, directory-service accounts, action accounts, network paths, roles, and deployment health, observed and expected states, owner, and reason for deviation.\n\nFor an approved change, define prerequisites, a limited test path, success and stop conditions, monitoring, and rollback. Check Active Directory, Windows DNS, time, certificates, domain-controller resources, network capture, cloud connectivity, and security operations in design order. Protect credentials, keys, recovery material, personal data, and sensitive topology in evidence.\n\n## Verification and evidence\n\nBuild a reproducible chain from Opening overview; Proxy and authentication explanation to the observed environment. Useful domain evidence includes sensor inventory, service and action-account permissions, health alerts, connectivity tests, portal state, and controlled detection tests; label every item with scope, timestamp, collector, and stable identifier.\n\nRetain the starting state, authorization, execution record, outcome, deviation, and final state as one review package. Move disruptive checks to an approved test path. Reopen the decision when versions, design, dependencies, ownership, or official guidance changes.\n\n## Official references\n\n- [Connect to the Defender for Identity service](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-for-identity/deploy/configure-proxy) — Microsoft" }, "json_ld": { "@context": "https://schema.org", "@graph": [ { "@type": "Organization", "@id": "https://dsesecurity.com/#organization", "name": "Detection Systems & Engineering", "alternateName": "DSE Security", "url": "https://dsesecurity.com/", "logo": { "@type": "ImageObject", "url": "https://update.dsesecurity.com/assets/dse-logo-20260812.png?v=1.8.20" } }, { "@type": "Organization", "@id": "https://update.dsesecurity.com/#editorial-team", "name": "DSE Security Editorial Team", "url": "https://update.dsesecurity.com/", "parentOrganization": { "@id": "https://dsesecurity.com/#organization" } }, { "@type": "WebSite", "@id": "https://update.dsesecurity.com/#website", "name": "DSE Updates", "alternateName": "DSE Security Knowledge Hub", "url": "https://update.dsesecurity.com/", "inLanguage": "en-US", "publisher": { "@id": "https://dsesecurity.com/#organization" }, "potentialAction": { "@type": "SearchAction", "target": { "@type": "EntryPoint", "urlTemplate": "https://update.dsesecurity.com/?q={search_term_string}" }, "query-input": "required name=search_term_string" } }, { "@type": "WebPage", "@id": "https://update.dsesecurity.com/updates/exempt-defender-for-identity-sensor-traffic-from-ssl-interception/", "url": "https://update.dsesecurity.com/updates/exempt-defender-for-identity-sensor-traffic-from-ssl-interception/", "isPartOf": { "@id": "https://update.dsesecurity.com/#website" }, "lastReviewed": "2026-08-26" }, { "@type": "BreadcrumbList", "@id": "https://update.dsesecurity.com/updates/exempt-defender-for-identity-sensor-traffic-from-ssl-interception/#breadcrumbs", "itemListElement": [ { "@type": "ListItem", "position": 1, "name": "DSE Updates", "item": "https://update.dsesecurity.com/" }, { "@type": "ListItem", "position": 2, "name": "Exempt Defender for Identity sensor traffic from SSL interception", "item": "https://update.dsesecurity.com/updates/exempt-defender-for-identity-sensor-traffic-from-ssl-interception/" } ] }, { "@type": [ "Article", "TechArticle" ], "@id": "https://update.dsesecurity.com/updates/exempt-defender-for-identity-sensor-traffic-from-ssl-interception/#article", "identifier": "https://update.dsesecurity.com/updates/exempt-defender-for-identity-sensor-traffic-from-ssl-interception/", "url": "https://update.dsesecurity.com/updates/exempt-defender-for-identity-sensor-traffic-from-ssl-interception/", "headline": "Exempt Defender for Identity sensor traffic from SSL interception", "description": "Use Connect to the Defender for Identity service to review this narrow operational decision without extending the source beyond its stated scope.", "abstract": "Use Connect to the Defender for Identity service to review this narrow operational decision without extending the source beyond its stated scope.", "articleBody": "Use this document to resolve one bounded operational decision: Exempt Defender for Identity sensor traffic from SSL interception. Only the official source and traced locations below supply facts. Confirm applicability before acting.\nSource fact:\nThe official Connect to the Defender for Identity service from Microsoft supports the following bounded statements:\n\nEach Defender for Identity sensor requires internet connectivity to the cloud service to report data and operate. The research record locates this support at Opening overview.\nSSL inspection and intercepting proxies are unsupported because they interfere with certificate-based mutual authentication; proxy traffic must pass to required service URLs without interception. The research record locates this support at Proxy and authentication explanation.\n\nDo not import neighboring assumptions into the source record. The supported task is a scoped comparison involving Defender for Identity workspaces, sensors, directory-service accounts, action accounts, network paths, roles, and deployment health and the conditions the source actually describes.\nWhat the source does not establish\nAllow only the documented service destinations and validate change controls; this source does not define an organization-wide proxy bypass policy. It does not establish a deployment’s current state, authorize a production change, prove compliance, or show that Active Directory, Windows DNS, time, certificates, domain-controller resources, network capture, cloud connectivity, and security operations are healthy. Documented options are review inputs, not universal mandates.\nApplicability questions\n\nFor source statement 1 at Opening overview, which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?\nFor source statement 2 at Proxy and authentication explanation, which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?\nWhich deployed instance of Defender for Identity workspaces, sensors, directory-service accounts, action accounts, network paths, roles, and deployment health will be compared with the source, and why that instance?\nHow will the review distinguish a source mismatch from a failure in Active Directory, Windows DNS, time, certificates, domain-controller resources, network capture, cloud connectivity, and security operations?\nWho approves the conclusion, exception, test window, and rollback threshold?\n\nDSE recommendation:\nDSE recommends using the cited source as the evidence anchor for this decision. Use a two-person review for the source interpretation and the resulting operational decision. Record the source location, examined part of Defender for Identity workspaces, sensors, directory-service accounts, action accounts, network paths, roles, and deployment health, observed and expected states, owner, and reason for deviation.\nFor an approved change, define prerequisites, a limited test path, success and stop conditions, monitoring, and rollback. Check Active Directory, Windows DNS, time, certificates, domain-controller resources, network capture, cloud connectivity, and security operations in design order. Protect credentials, keys, recovery material, personal data, and sensitive topology in evidence.\nVerification and evidence\nBuild a reproducible chain from Opening overview; Proxy and authentication explanation to the observed environment. Useful domain evidence includes sensor inventory, service and action-account permissions, health alerts, connectivity tests, portal state, and controlled detection tests; label every item with scope, timestamp, collector, and stable identifier.\nRetain the starting state, authorization, execution record, outcome, deviation, and final state as one review package. Move disruptive checks to an approved test path. Reopen the decision when versions, design, dependencies, ownership, or official guidance changes.\nOfficial references\n\nConnect to the Defender for Identity service — Microsoft", "datePublished": "2026-08-27T12:13:35+00:00", "dateModified": "2026-08-27T13:01:31+00:00", "mainEntityOfPage": { "@id": "https://update.dsesecurity.com/updates/exempt-defender-for-identity-sensor-traffic-from-ssl-interception/" }, "inLanguage": "en-US", "isAccessibleForFree": true, "author": { "@type": "Organization", "name": "DSE Security Editorial Team", "url": "https://update.dsesecurity.com/#editorial-team" }, "publisher": { "@id": "https://dsesecurity.com/#organization" }, "image": { "@type": "ImageObject", "@id": "https://update.dsesecurity.com/updates/exempt-defender-for-identity-sensor-traffic-from-ssl-interception/#primaryimage", "url": "https://update.dsesecurity.com/assets/editorial/identity-cloud-social-v2.jpg?v=1.8.20", "contentUrl": "https://update.dsesecurity.com/assets/editorial/identity-cloud-social-v2.jpg?v=1.8.20", "width": 1200, "height": 630, "caption": "Exempt Defender for Identity sensor traffic from SSL interception" }, "articleSection": [ "Cybersecurity", "IT", "Microsoft 365 & Identity" ], "keywords": [ "Cybersecurity", "IT", "Microsoft 365 & Identity", "Briefing", "Advisory priority" ], "genre": "Briefing", "about": [ { "@type": "Thing", "name": "Cybersecurity", "url": "https://update.dsesecurity.com/topic/cybersecurity/" }, { "@type": "Thing", "name": "IT", "url": "https://update.dsesecurity.com/topic/it/" }, { "@type": "Thing", "name": "Microsoft 365 & Identity", "url": "https://update.dsesecurity.com/topic/microsoft-365-identity/" } ], "wordCount": 521, "timeRequired": "PT3M", "publishingPrinciples": "https://update.dsesecurity.com/updates/dse-updates-editorial-methodology/", "usageInfo": "https://update.dsesecurity.com/usage/", "copyrightHolder": { "@id": "https://dsesecurity.com/#organization" }, "copyrightNotice": "Copyright © 2026 Detection Systems & Engineering. All rights reserved.", "citation": { "@type": "CreativeWork", "name": "Connect to the Defender for Identity service", "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-for-identity/deploy/configure-proxy", "datePublished": "2026-07-02" } } ] } }