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        "title": "Run duplicate-address detection before assigning a SLAAC address",
        "summary": "Use RFC 4862 — IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration to review this narrow operational decision without extending the source beyond its stated scope.",
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        "potentially_affected": "Teams, systems, services, or facilities within the stated scope of RFC 4862 — IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration",
        "dse_recommendation": "Compare the observed state with the cited official source, document applicability and exceptions, and test any approved change with rollback safeguards.",
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            "name": "RFC 4862 — IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration",
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        "content_html": "<p>Frame this document as a source-led configuration and assurance check: Run duplicate-address detection before assigning a SLAAC address. Only the official source and traced locations below supply facts. Confirm applicability before acting.</p>\n<h2>Source fact:</h2>\n<p>The official <a href=\"https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4862.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">RFC 4862 — IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration</a> from RFC Editor / Internet Engineering Task Force supports the following bounded statements:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>Duplicate Address Detection must run before assigning each unicast address, including SLAAC, DHCPv6, and manually configured addresses, except for the specified disabled and anycast cases. The research record locates this support at <strong>Section 5.4 (Duplicate Address Detection)</strong>.</li>\n<li>A DAD probe joins the all-nodes and tentative address&#8217;s solicited-node groups, then sends Neighbor Solicitations from the unspecified address to that solicited-node multicast address. The research record locates this support at <strong>Section 5.4.2 (Sending Neighbor Solicitation Messages)</strong>.</li>\n<li>A tentative address found to be duplicated must not be assigned, and the node should record a system-management error. The research record locates this support at <strong>Section 5.4.5 (When Duplicate Address Detection Fails)</strong>.</li>\n</ul>\n<p>Keep the evidence boundary at these traced claims. They support a review of address plans, interfaces, routes, peers, protocol roles, timers, middleboxes, and intended failure domains; they do not support conclusions outside the source&#8217;s stated conditions.</p>\n<h2>What the source does not establish</h2>\n<p>This RFC evidence supports only the named network-protocol decision; it does not select vendor settings, topology, capacity, or an acceptable failure mode. A correct source interpretation can still be inapplicable to a particular design. Confirm DNS, Active Directory authentication, PKI, time, routing policy, transport reachability, and monitoring, ownership, and change authority instead of treating documented behavior as a deployment guarantee.</p>\n<h2>Applicability questions</h2>\n<ul>\n<li>For source statement 1 at <strong>Section 5.4 (Duplicate Address Detection)</strong>, which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?</li>\n<li>For source statement 2 at <strong>Section 5.4.2 (Sending Neighbor Solicitation Messages)</strong>, which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?</li>\n<li>For source statement 3 at <strong>Section 5.4.5 (When Duplicate Address Detection Fails)</strong>, which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?</li>\n<li>Within address plans, interfaces, routes, peers, protocol roles, timers, middleboxes, and intended failure domains, which versions, roles, and configuration states define the review population?</li>\n<li>Could DNS, Active Directory authentication, PKI, time, routing policy, transport reachability, and monitoring invalidate the test, hide a failure, or change applicability?</li>\n<li>Who owns the decision, and which observation requires stopping, escalation, or rollback?</li>\n</ul>\n<h2>DSE recommendation:</h2>\n<p>DSE recommends using the cited source as the evidence anchor for this decision. Anchor the review in the cited section and keep observation separate from interpretation. Record the source location, examined part of address plans, interfaces, routes, peers, protocol roles, timers, middleboxes, and intended failure domains, observed and expected states, owner, and reason for deviation.</p>\n<p>If the review warrants change, use a bounded implementation with prerequisites, test population, monitoring, abort criteria, and a rehearsed reversal. Sequence checks for DNS, Active Directory authentication, PKI, time, routing policy, transport reachability, and monitoring and sanitize protected material before retention.</p>\n<h2>Verification and evidence</h2>\n<p>Keep the source locations <strong>Section 5.4 (Duplicate Address Detection)</strong>; <strong>Section 5.4.2 (Sending Neighbor Solicitation Messages)</strong>; <strong>Section 5.4.5 (When Duplicate Address Detection Fails)</strong> adjacent to the sanitized artifacts used for comparison. Prefer configuration snapshots, route or neighbor state, packet captures, counters, topology records, and controlled failover results, with enough identity and timing data for an independent recheck.</p>\n<p>Close the review only when the evidence, exception handling, resulting action, and after-state are linked. Schedule a new review after material technical, organizational, incident, or source changes; today&#8217;s observation is not a continuing guarantee.</p>\n<h2>Official references</h2>\n<ul>\n<li><a href=\"https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4862.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">RFC 4862 — IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration</a> — RFC Editor / Internet Engineering Task Force</li>\n</ul>",
        "content_text": "Frame this document as a source-led configuration and assurance check: Run duplicate-address detection before assigning a SLAAC address. Only the official source and traced locations below supply facts. Confirm applicability before acting.\nSource fact:\nThe official RFC 4862 — IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration from RFC Editor / Internet Engineering Task Force supports the following bounded statements:\n\nDuplicate Address Detection must run before assigning each unicast address, including SLAAC, DHCPv6, and manually configured addresses, except for the specified disabled and anycast cases. The research record locates this support at Section 5.4 (Duplicate Address Detection).\nA DAD probe joins the all-nodes and tentative address’s solicited-node groups, then sends Neighbor Solicitations from the unspecified address to that solicited-node multicast address. The research record locates this support at Section 5.4.2 (Sending Neighbor Solicitation Messages).\nA tentative address found to be duplicated must not be assigned, and the node should record a system-management error. The research record locates this support at Section 5.4.5 (When Duplicate Address Detection Fails).\n\nKeep the evidence boundary at these traced claims. They support a review of address plans, interfaces, routes, peers, protocol roles, timers, middleboxes, and intended failure domains; they do not support conclusions outside the source’s stated conditions.\nWhat the source does not establish\nThis RFC evidence supports only the named network-protocol decision; it does not select vendor settings, topology, capacity, or an acceptable failure mode. A correct source interpretation can still be inapplicable to a particular design. Confirm DNS, Active Directory authentication, PKI, time, routing policy, transport reachability, and monitoring, ownership, and change authority instead of treating documented behavior as a deployment guarantee.\nApplicability questions\n\nFor source statement 1 at Section 5.4 (Duplicate Address Detection), which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?\nFor source statement 2 at Section 5.4.2 (Sending Neighbor Solicitation Messages), which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?\nFor source statement 3 at Section 5.4.5 (When Duplicate Address Detection Fails), which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?\nWithin address plans, interfaces, routes, peers, protocol roles, timers, middleboxes, and intended failure domains, which versions, roles, and configuration states define the review population?\nCould DNS, Active Directory authentication, PKI, time, routing policy, transport reachability, and monitoring invalidate the test, hide a failure, or change applicability?\nWho owns the decision, and which observation requires stopping, escalation, or rollback?\n\nDSE recommendation:\nDSE recommends using the cited source as the evidence anchor for this decision. Anchor the review in the cited section and keep observation separate from interpretation. Record the source location, examined part of address plans, interfaces, routes, peers, protocol roles, timers, middleboxes, and intended failure domains, observed and expected states, owner, and reason for deviation.\nIf the review warrants change, use a bounded implementation with prerequisites, test population, monitoring, abort criteria, and a rehearsed reversal. Sequence checks for DNS, Active Directory authentication, PKI, time, routing policy, transport reachability, and monitoring and sanitize protected material before retention.\nVerification and evidence\nKeep the source locations Section 5.4 (Duplicate Address Detection); Section 5.4.2 (Sending Neighbor Solicitation Messages); Section 5.4.5 (When Duplicate Address Detection Fails) adjacent to the sanitized artifacts used for comparison. Prefer configuration snapshots, route or neighbor state, packet captures, counters, topology records, and controlled failover results, with enough identity and timing data for an independent recheck.\nClose the review only when the evidence, exception handling, resulting action, and after-state are linked. Schedule a new review after material technical, organizational, incident, or source changes; today’s observation is not a continuing guarantee.\nOfficial references\n\nRFC 4862 — IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration — RFC Editor / Internet Engineering Task Force",
        "content_markdown": "Frame this document as a source-led configuration and assurance check: Run duplicate-address detection before assigning a SLAAC address. Only the official source and traced locations below supply facts. Confirm applicability before acting.\n\n## Source fact:\n\nThe official [RFC 4862 — IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4862.html) from RFC Editor / Internet Engineering Task Force supports the following bounded statements:\n\n- Duplicate Address Detection must run before assigning each unicast address, including SLAAC, DHCPv6, and manually configured addresses, except for the specified disabled and anycast cases. The research record locates this support at Section 5.4 (Duplicate Address Detection).\n\n- A DAD probe joins the all-nodes and tentative address’s solicited-node groups, then sends Neighbor Solicitations from the unspecified address to that solicited-node multicast address. The research record locates this support at Section 5.4.2 (Sending Neighbor Solicitation Messages).\n\n- A tentative address found to be duplicated must not be assigned, and the node should record a system-management error. The research record locates this support at Section 5.4.5 (When Duplicate Address Detection Fails).\n\nKeep the evidence boundary at these traced claims. They support a review of address plans, interfaces, routes, peers, protocol roles, timers, middleboxes, and intended failure domains; they do not support conclusions outside the source’s stated conditions.\n\n## What the source does not establish\n\nThis RFC evidence supports only the named network-protocol decision; it does not select vendor settings, topology, capacity, or an acceptable failure mode. A correct source interpretation can still be inapplicable to a particular design. Confirm DNS, Active Directory authentication, PKI, time, routing policy, transport reachability, and monitoring, ownership, and change authority instead of treating documented behavior as a deployment guarantee.\n\n## Applicability questions\n\n- For source statement 1 at Section 5.4 (Duplicate Address Detection), which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?\n\n- For source statement 2 at Section 5.4.2 (Sending Neighbor Solicitation Messages), which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?\n\n- For source statement 3 at Section 5.4.5 (When Duplicate Address Detection Fails), which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?\n\n- Within address plans, interfaces, routes, peers, protocol roles, timers, middleboxes, and intended failure domains, which versions, roles, and configuration states define the review population?\n\n- Could DNS, Active Directory authentication, PKI, time, routing policy, transport reachability, and monitoring invalidate the test, hide a failure, or change applicability?\n\n- Who owns the decision, and which observation requires stopping, escalation, or rollback?\n\n## DSE recommendation:\n\nDSE recommends using the cited source as the evidence anchor for this decision. Anchor the review in the cited section and keep observation separate from interpretation. Record the source location, examined part of address plans, interfaces, routes, peers, protocol roles, timers, middleboxes, and intended failure domains, observed and expected states, owner, and reason for deviation.\n\nIf the review warrants change, use a bounded implementation with prerequisites, test population, monitoring, abort criteria, and a rehearsed reversal. Sequence checks for DNS, Active Directory authentication, PKI, time, routing policy, transport reachability, and monitoring and sanitize protected material before retention.\n\n## Verification and evidence\n\nKeep the source locations Section 5.4 (Duplicate Address Detection); Section 5.4.2 (Sending Neighbor Solicitation Messages); Section 5.4.5 (When Duplicate Address Detection Fails) adjacent to the sanitized artifacts used for comparison. Prefer configuration snapshots, route or neighbor state, packet captures, counters, topology records, and controlled failover results, with enough identity and timing data for an independent recheck.\n\nClose the review only when the evidence, exception handling, resulting action, and after-state are linked. Schedule a new review after material technical, organizational, incident, or source changes; today’s observation is not a continuing guarantee.\n\n## Official references\n\n- [RFC 4862 — IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4862.html) — RFC Editor / Internet Engineering Task Force"
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                "description": "Use RFC 4862 — IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration to review this narrow operational decision without extending the source beyond its stated scope.",
                "abstract": "Use RFC 4862 — IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration to review this narrow operational decision without extending the source beyond its stated scope.",
                "articleBody": "Frame this document as a source-led configuration and assurance check: Run duplicate-address detection before assigning a SLAAC address. Only the official source and traced locations below supply facts. Confirm applicability before acting.\nSource fact:\nThe official RFC 4862 — IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration from RFC Editor / Internet Engineering Task Force supports the following bounded statements:\n\nDuplicate Address Detection must run before assigning each unicast address, including SLAAC, DHCPv6, and manually configured addresses, except for the specified disabled and anycast cases. The research record locates this support at Section 5.4 (Duplicate Address Detection).\nA DAD probe joins the all-nodes and tentative address’s solicited-node groups, then sends Neighbor Solicitations from the unspecified address to that solicited-node multicast address. The research record locates this support at Section 5.4.2 (Sending Neighbor Solicitation Messages).\nA tentative address found to be duplicated must not be assigned, and the node should record a system-management error. The research record locates this support at Section 5.4.5 (When Duplicate Address Detection Fails).\n\nKeep the evidence boundary at these traced claims. They support a review of address plans, interfaces, routes, peers, protocol roles, timers, middleboxes, and intended failure domains; they do not support conclusions outside the source’s stated conditions.\nWhat the source does not establish\nThis RFC evidence supports only the named network-protocol decision; it does not select vendor settings, topology, capacity, or an acceptable failure mode. A correct source interpretation can still be inapplicable to a particular design. Confirm DNS, Active Directory authentication, PKI, time, routing policy, transport reachability, and monitoring, ownership, and change authority instead of treating documented behavior as a deployment guarantee.\nApplicability questions\n\nFor source statement 1 at Section 5.4 (Duplicate Address Detection), which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?\nFor source statement 2 at Section 5.4.2 (Sending Neighbor Solicitation Messages), which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?\nFor source statement 3 at Section 5.4.5 (When Duplicate Address Detection Fails), which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?\nWithin address plans, interfaces, routes, peers, protocol roles, timers, middleboxes, and intended failure domains, which versions, roles, and configuration states define the review population?\nCould DNS, Active Directory authentication, PKI, time, routing policy, transport reachability, and monitoring invalidate the test, hide a failure, or change applicability?\nWho owns the decision, and which observation requires stopping, escalation, or rollback?\n\nDSE recommendation:\nDSE recommends using the cited source as the evidence anchor for this decision. Anchor the review in the cited section and keep observation separate from interpretation. Record the source location, examined part of address plans, interfaces, routes, peers, protocol roles, timers, middleboxes, and intended failure domains, observed and expected states, owner, and reason for deviation.\nIf the review warrants change, use a bounded implementation with prerequisites, test population, monitoring, abort criteria, and a rehearsed reversal. Sequence checks for DNS, Active Directory authentication, PKI, time, routing policy, transport reachability, and monitoring and sanitize protected material before retention.\nVerification and evidence\nKeep the source locations Section 5.4 (Duplicate Address Detection); Section 5.4.2 (Sending Neighbor Solicitation Messages); Section 5.4.5 (When Duplicate Address Detection Fails) adjacent to the sanitized artifacts used for comparison. Prefer configuration snapshots, route or neighbor state, packet captures, counters, topology records, and controlled failover results, with enough identity and timing data for an independent recheck.\nClose the review only when the evidence, exception handling, resulting action, and after-state are linked. Schedule a new review after material technical, organizational, incident, or source changes; today’s observation is not a continuing guarantee.\nOfficial references\n\nRFC 4862 — IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration — RFC Editor / Internet Engineering Task Force",
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