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        "title": "Scope OSPFv3 packets and LSAs correctly on IPv6 links",
        "summary": "Use RFC 5340 — OSPF for IPv6 to review this narrow operational decision without extending the source beyond its stated scope.",
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        "dse_recommendation": "Compare the observed state with the cited official source, document applicability and exceptions, and test any approved change with rollback safeguards.",
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        "content_html": "<p>Use this document to connect an official requirement or behavior to observable evidence: Scope OSPFv3 packets and LSAs correctly on IPv6 links. Only the official source and traced locations below supply facts. Confirm applicability before acting.</p>\n<h2>Source fact:</h2>\n<p>The official <a href=\"https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5340.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">RFC 5340 — OSPF for IPv6</a> from RFC Editor / Internet Engineering Task Force supports the following bounded statements:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>OSPFv3 packets use the interface&#8217;s link-local IPv6 address on ordinary interfaces, while packets on a virtual link must use a global-scope source address. The research record locates this support at <strong>Section 2.5 (Use of Link-Local Addresses)</strong>.</li>\n<li>Link-local addresses may appear in link-LSAs but must not be advertised in inter-area-prefix, AS-external, NSSA, or intra-area-prefix LSAs. The research record locates this support at <strong>Section 2.5 (Use of Link-Local Addresses), LSA restrictions</strong>.</li>\n<li>The LS type explicitly encodes whether an LSA floods only on its originating link, throughout one area, or throughout the autonomous system. The research record locates this support at <strong>Section 2.3 (Addition of Flooding Scope)</strong>.</li>\n</ul>\n<p>Keep the evidence boundary at these traced claims. They support a review of address plans, interfaces, routes, peers, protocol roles, timers, middleboxes, and intended failure domains; they do not support conclusions outside the source&#8217;s stated conditions.</p>\n<h2>What the source does not establish</h2>\n<p>This RFC evidence supports only the named network-protocol decision; it does not select vendor settings, topology, capacity, or an acceptable failure mode. A correct source interpretation can still be inapplicable to a particular design. Confirm DNS, Active Directory authentication, PKI, time, routing policy, transport reachability, and monitoring, ownership, and change authority instead of treating documented behavior as a deployment guarantee.</p>\n<h2>Applicability questions</h2>\n<ul>\n<li>For source statement 1 at <strong>Section 2.5 (Use of Link-Local Addresses)</strong>, which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?</li>\n<li>For source statement 2 at <strong>Section 2.5 (Use of Link-Local Addresses), LSA restrictions</strong>, which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?</li>\n<li>For source statement 3 at <strong>Section 2.3 (Addition of Flooding Scope)</strong>, which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?</li>\n<li>Within address plans, interfaces, routes, peers, protocol roles, timers, middleboxes, and intended failure domains, which versions, roles, and configuration states define the review population?</li>\n<li>Could DNS, Active Directory authentication, PKI, time, routing policy, transport reachability, and monitoring invalidate the test, hide a failure, or change applicability?</li>\n<li>Who owns the decision, and which observation requires stopping, escalation, or rollback?</li>\n</ul>\n<h2>DSE recommendation:</h2>\n<p>DSE recommends using the cited source as the evidence anchor for this decision. Anchor the review in the cited section and keep observation separate from interpretation. Record the source location, examined part of address plans, interfaces, routes, peers, protocol roles, timers, middleboxes, and intended failure domains, observed and expected states, owner, and reason for deviation.</p>\n<p>Translate the conclusion into change control only after documenting dependencies, impact, test method, expected signals, failure signals, and restoration steps. Include DNS, Active Directory authentication, PKI, time, routing policy, transport reachability, and monitoring, while excluding secrets and sensitive personal or topology data from ordinary tickets.</p>\n<h2>Verification and evidence</h2>\n<p>Keep the source locations <strong>Section 2.5 (Use of Link-Local Addresses)</strong>; <strong>Section 2.5 (Use of Link-Local Addresses), LSA restrictions</strong>; <strong>Section 2.3 (Addition of Flooding Scope)</strong> adjacent to the sanitized artifacts used for comparison. Prefer configuration snapshots, route or neighbor state, packet captures, counters, topology records, and controlled failover results, with enough identity and timing data for an independent recheck.</p>\n<p>Record the decision even when no change is made, including uncertainty and the next trigger. Use safe testing conditions for disruptive work, preserve rollback proof, and revisit the conclusion after relevant platform, dependency, vendor, or ownership changes.</p>\n<h2>Official references</h2>\n<ul>\n<li><a href=\"https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5340.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">RFC 5340 — OSPF for IPv6</a> — RFC Editor / Internet Engineering Task Force</li>\n</ul>",
        "content_text": "Use this document to connect an official requirement or behavior to observable evidence: Scope OSPFv3 packets and LSAs correctly on IPv6 links. Only the official source and traced locations below supply facts. Confirm applicability before acting.\nSource fact:\nThe official RFC 5340 — OSPF for IPv6 from RFC Editor / Internet Engineering Task Force supports the following bounded statements:\n\nOSPFv3 packets use the interface’s link-local IPv6 address on ordinary interfaces, while packets on a virtual link must use a global-scope source address. The research record locates this support at Section 2.5 (Use of Link-Local Addresses).\nLink-local addresses may appear in link-LSAs but must not be advertised in inter-area-prefix, AS-external, NSSA, or intra-area-prefix LSAs. The research record locates this support at Section 2.5 (Use of Link-Local Addresses), LSA restrictions.\nThe LS type explicitly encodes whether an LSA floods only on its originating link, throughout one area, or throughout the autonomous system. The research record locates this support at Section 2.3 (Addition of Flooding Scope).\n\nKeep the evidence boundary at these traced claims. They support a review of address plans, interfaces, routes, peers, protocol roles, timers, middleboxes, and intended failure domains; they do not support conclusions outside the source’s stated conditions.\nWhat the source does not establish\nThis RFC evidence supports only the named network-protocol decision; it does not select vendor settings, topology, capacity, or an acceptable failure mode. A correct source interpretation can still be inapplicable to a particular design. Confirm DNS, Active Directory authentication, PKI, time, routing policy, transport reachability, and monitoring, ownership, and change authority instead of treating documented behavior as a deployment guarantee.\nApplicability questions\n\nFor source statement 1 at Section 2.5 (Use of Link-Local Addresses), which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?\nFor source statement 2 at Section 2.5 (Use of Link-Local Addresses), LSA restrictions, which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?\nFor source statement 3 at Section 2.3 (Addition of Flooding Scope), which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?\nWithin address plans, interfaces, routes, peers, protocol roles, timers, middleboxes, and intended failure domains, which versions, roles, and configuration states define the review population?\nCould DNS, Active Directory authentication, PKI, time, routing policy, transport reachability, and monitoring invalidate the test, hide a failure, or change applicability?\nWho owns the decision, and which observation requires stopping, escalation, or rollback?\n\nDSE recommendation:\nDSE recommends using the cited source as the evidence anchor for this decision. Anchor the review in the cited section and keep observation separate from interpretation. Record the source location, examined part of address plans, interfaces, routes, peers, protocol roles, timers, middleboxes, and intended failure domains, observed and expected states, owner, and reason for deviation.\nTranslate the conclusion into change control only after documenting dependencies, impact, test method, expected signals, failure signals, and restoration steps. Include DNS, Active Directory authentication, PKI, time, routing policy, transport reachability, and monitoring, while excluding secrets and sensitive personal or topology data from ordinary tickets.\nVerification and evidence\nKeep the source locations Section 2.5 (Use of Link-Local Addresses); Section 2.5 (Use of Link-Local Addresses), LSA restrictions; Section 2.3 (Addition of Flooding Scope) adjacent to the sanitized artifacts used for comparison. Prefer configuration snapshots, route or neighbor state, packet captures, counters, topology records, and controlled failover results, with enough identity and timing data for an independent recheck.\nRecord the decision even when no change is made, including uncertainty and the next trigger. Use safe testing conditions for disruptive work, preserve rollback proof, and revisit the conclusion after relevant platform, dependency, vendor, or ownership changes.\nOfficial references\n\nRFC 5340 — OSPF for IPv6 — RFC Editor / Internet Engineering Task Force",
        "content_markdown": "Use this document to connect an official requirement or behavior to observable evidence: Scope OSPFv3 packets and LSAs correctly on IPv6 links. Only the official source and traced locations below supply facts. Confirm applicability before acting.\n\n## Source fact:\n\nThe official [RFC 5340 — OSPF for IPv6](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5340.html) from RFC Editor / Internet Engineering Task Force supports the following bounded statements:\n\n- OSPFv3 packets use the interface’s link-local IPv6 address on ordinary interfaces, while packets on a virtual link must use a global-scope source address. The research record locates this support at Section 2.5 (Use of Link-Local Addresses).\n\n- Link-local addresses may appear in link-LSAs but must not be advertised in inter-area-prefix, AS-external, NSSA, or intra-area-prefix LSAs. The research record locates this support at Section 2.5 (Use of Link-Local Addresses), LSA restrictions.\n\n- The LS type explicitly encodes whether an LSA floods only on its originating link, throughout one area, or throughout the autonomous system. The research record locates this support at Section 2.3 (Addition of Flooding Scope).\n\nKeep the evidence boundary at these traced claims. They support a review of address plans, interfaces, routes, peers, protocol roles, timers, middleboxes, and intended failure domains; they do not support conclusions outside the source’s stated conditions.\n\n## What the source does not establish\n\nThis RFC evidence supports only the named network-protocol decision; it does not select vendor settings, topology, capacity, or an acceptable failure mode. A correct source interpretation can still be inapplicable to a particular design. Confirm DNS, Active Directory authentication, PKI, time, routing policy, transport reachability, and monitoring, ownership, and change authority instead of treating documented behavior as a deployment guarantee.\n\n## Applicability questions\n\n- For source statement 1 at Section 2.5 (Use of Link-Local Addresses), which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?\n\n- For source statement 2 at Section 2.5 (Use of Link-Local Addresses), LSA restrictions, which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?\n\n- For source statement 3 at Section 2.3 (Addition of Flooding Scope), which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?\n\n- Within address plans, interfaces, routes, peers, protocol roles, timers, middleboxes, and intended failure domains, which versions, roles, and configuration states define the review population?\n\n- Could DNS, Active Directory authentication, PKI, time, routing policy, transport reachability, and monitoring invalidate the test, hide a failure, or change applicability?\n\n- Who owns the decision, and which observation requires stopping, escalation, or rollback?\n\n## DSE recommendation:\n\nDSE recommends using the cited source as the evidence anchor for this decision. Anchor the review in the cited section and keep observation separate from interpretation. Record the source location, examined part of address plans, interfaces, routes, peers, protocol roles, timers, middleboxes, and intended failure domains, observed and expected states, owner, and reason for deviation.\n\nTranslate the conclusion into change control only after documenting dependencies, impact, test method, expected signals, failure signals, and restoration steps. Include DNS, Active Directory authentication, PKI, time, routing policy, transport reachability, and monitoring, while excluding secrets and sensitive personal or topology data from ordinary tickets.\n\n## Verification and evidence\n\nKeep the source locations Section 2.5 (Use of Link-Local Addresses); Section 2.5 (Use of Link-Local Addresses), LSA restrictions; Section 2.3 (Addition of Flooding Scope) adjacent to the sanitized artifacts used for comparison. Prefer configuration snapshots, route or neighbor state, packet captures, counters, topology records, and controlled failover results, with enough identity and timing data for an independent recheck.\n\nRecord the decision even when no change is made, including uncertainty and the next trigger. Use safe testing conditions for disruptive work, preserve rollback proof, and revisit the conclusion after relevant platform, dependency, vendor, or ownership changes.\n\n## Official references\n\n- [RFC 5340 — OSPF for IPv6](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5340.html) — RFC Editor / Internet Engineering Task Force"
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                "description": "Use RFC 5340 — OSPF for IPv6 to review this narrow operational decision without extending the source beyond its stated scope.",
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                "articleBody": "Use this document to connect an official requirement or behavior to observable evidence: Scope OSPFv3 packets and LSAs correctly on IPv6 links. Only the official source and traced locations below supply facts. Confirm applicability before acting.\nSource fact:\nThe official RFC 5340 — OSPF for IPv6 from RFC Editor / Internet Engineering Task Force supports the following bounded statements:\n\nOSPFv3 packets use the interface’s link-local IPv6 address on ordinary interfaces, while packets on a virtual link must use a global-scope source address. The research record locates this support at Section 2.5 (Use of Link-Local Addresses).\nLink-local addresses may appear in link-LSAs but must not be advertised in inter-area-prefix, AS-external, NSSA, or intra-area-prefix LSAs. The research record locates this support at Section 2.5 (Use of Link-Local Addresses), LSA restrictions.\nThe LS type explicitly encodes whether an LSA floods only on its originating link, throughout one area, or throughout the autonomous system. The research record locates this support at Section 2.3 (Addition of Flooding Scope).\n\nKeep the evidence boundary at these traced claims. They support a review of address plans, interfaces, routes, peers, protocol roles, timers, middleboxes, and intended failure domains; they do not support conclusions outside the source’s stated conditions.\nWhat the source does not establish\nThis RFC evidence supports only the named network-protocol decision; it does not select vendor settings, topology, capacity, or an acceptable failure mode. A correct source interpretation can still be inapplicable to a particular design. Confirm DNS, Active Directory authentication, PKI, time, routing policy, transport reachability, and monitoring, ownership, and change authority instead of treating documented behavior as a deployment guarantee.\nApplicability questions\n\nFor source statement 1 at Section 2.5 (Use of Link-Local Addresses), which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?\nFor source statement 2 at Section 2.5 (Use of Link-Local Addresses), LSA restrictions, which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?\nFor source statement 3 at Section 2.3 (Addition of Flooding Scope), which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?\nWithin address plans, interfaces, routes, peers, protocol roles, timers, middleboxes, and intended failure domains, which versions, roles, and configuration states define the review population?\nCould DNS, Active Directory authentication, PKI, time, routing policy, transport reachability, and monitoring invalidate the test, hide a failure, or change applicability?\nWho owns the decision, and which observation requires stopping, escalation, or rollback?\n\nDSE recommendation:\nDSE recommends using the cited source as the evidence anchor for this decision. Anchor the review in the cited section and keep observation separate from interpretation. Record the source location, examined part of address plans, interfaces, routes, peers, protocol roles, timers, middleboxes, and intended failure domains, observed and expected states, owner, and reason for deviation.\nTranslate the conclusion into change control only after documenting dependencies, impact, test method, expected signals, failure signals, and restoration steps. Include DNS, Active Directory authentication, PKI, time, routing policy, transport reachability, and monitoring, while excluding secrets and sensitive personal or topology data from ordinary tickets.\nVerification and evidence\nKeep the source locations Section 2.5 (Use of Link-Local Addresses); Section 2.5 (Use of Link-Local Addresses), LSA restrictions; Section 2.3 (Addition of Flooding Scope) adjacent to the sanitized artifacts used for comparison. Prefer configuration snapshots, route or neighbor state, packet captures, counters, topology records, and controlled failover results, with enough identity and timing data for an independent recheck.\nRecord the decision even when no change is made, including uncertainty and the next trigger. Use safe testing conditions for disruptive work, preserve rollback proof, and revisit the conclusion after relevant platform, dependency, vendor, or ownership changes.\nOfficial references\n\nRFC 5340 — OSPF for IPv6 — RFC Editor / Internet Engineering Task Force",
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