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        "title": "Serve stale DNS data only inside explicit freshness and failure limits",
        "summary": "Use RFC 8767 — Serving Stale Data to Improve DNS Resiliency to review this narrow operational decision without extending the source beyond its stated scope.",
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        "published_at": "2026-08-27T12:17:22+00:00",
        "modified_at": "2026-08-27T12:18:10+00:00",
        "reviewed_on": "2026-08-26",
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        "potentially_affected": "Teams, systems, services, or facilities within the stated scope of RFC 8767 — Serving Stale Data to Improve DNS Resiliency",
        "dse_recommendation": "Compare the observed state with the cited official source, document applicability and exceptions, and test any approved change with rollback safeguards.",
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            "name": "RFC 8767 — Serving Stale Data to Improve DNS Resiliency",
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        "content_html": "<p>Use this document to connect an official requirement or behavior to observable evidence: Serve stale DNS data only inside explicit freshness and failure limits. Only the official source and traced locations below supply facts. Confirm applicability before acting.</p>\n<h2>Source fact:</h2>\n<p>The official <a href=\"https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8767.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">RFC 8767 — Serving Stale Data to Improve DNS Resiliency</a> from RFC Editor / Internet Engineering Task Force supports the following bounded statements:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>After an expired DNS record cannot be refreshed authoritatively, a recursive resolver may temporarily use the record as though it were unexpired. The research record locates this support at <strong>Section 4 (Standards Action), amended TTL definition</strong>.</li>\n<li>A stale response must assign each expired record a positive TTL; the recommended response TTL is 30 seconds. The research record locates this support at <strong>Section 4 (Standards Action), stale-response TTL</strong>.</li>\n<li>A serve-stale design bounds client wait, resolution work, failure rechecks, and maximum stale retention with separate timers. The research record locates this support at <strong>Section 5 (Example Method)</strong>.</li>\n</ul>\n<p>The source support ends with the statements listed above. Use them to examine authoritative zones, delegations, resolvers, caches, record owners, and the clients that consume the resulting answers in the applicable environment, not to imply a wider guarantee.</p>\n<h2>What the source does not establish</h2>\n<p>This RFC evidence supports only the named DNS protocol decision; it does not prove Windows implementation support or a safe production configuration. No current deployment state or change approval follows from the source alone. Validate Windows DNS roles, Active Directory-integrated data, forwarding paths, time, routing, firewalls, and registrar or registry state, and treat examples or options as conditional inputs rather than defaults.</p>\n<h2>Applicability questions</h2>\n<ul>\n<li>For source statement 1 at <strong>Section 4 (Standards Action), amended TTL definition</strong>, which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?</li>\n<li>For source statement 2 at <strong>Section 4 (Standards Action), stale-response TTL</strong>, which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?</li>\n<li>For source statement 3 at <strong>Section 5 (Example Method)</strong>, which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?</li>\n<li>Within authoritative zones, delegations, resolvers, caches, record owners, and the clients that consume the resulting answers, which versions, roles, and configuration states define the review population?</li>\n<li>Could Windows DNS roles, Active Directory-integrated data, forwarding paths, time, routing, firewalls, and registrar or registry state invalidate the test, hide a failure, or change applicability?</li>\n<li>Who owns the decision, and which observation requires stopping, escalation, or rollback?</li>\n</ul>\n<h2>DSE recommendation:</h2>\n<p>DSE recommends using the cited source as the evidence anchor for this decision. Make the source, asset scope, owner, and expected outcome explicit in the review record. Record the source location, examined part of authoritative zones, delegations, resolvers, caches, record owners, and the clients that consume the resulting answers, observed and expected states, owner, and reason for deviation.</p>\n<p>Do not move from citation to production in one step. Pilot the decision where practical, observe agreed signals, retain a reversal point, and verify Windows DNS roles, Active Directory-integrated data, forwarding paths, time, routing, firewalls, and registrar or registry state. Handle credentials, keys, recovery data, and personal information through approved secure channels.</p>\n<h2>Verification and evidence</h2>\n<p>A reviewer should be able to retrace the decision from <strong>Section 4 (Standards Action), amended TTL definition</strong>; <strong>Section 4 (Standards Action), stale-response TTL</strong>; <strong>Section 5 (Example Method)</strong> through zone data, packet captures, query transcripts, delegation checks, resolver configuration, and negative-answer behavior. Record what was collected, where, when, by whom, and which system or role it represents.</p>\n<p>Preserve both successful and failed observations, along with approval and rollback evidence. Avoid uncontrolled production experiments. Assign an expiry or event-driven recheck so the conclusion is not treated as permanent.</p>\n<h2>Official references</h2>\n<ul>\n<li><a href=\"https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8767.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">RFC 8767 — Serving Stale Data to Improve DNS Resiliency</a> — RFC Editor / Internet Engineering Task Force</li>\n</ul>",
        "content_text": "Use this document to connect an official requirement or behavior to observable evidence: Serve stale DNS data only inside explicit freshness and failure limits. Only the official source and traced locations below supply facts. Confirm applicability before acting.\nSource fact:\nThe official RFC 8767 — Serving Stale Data to Improve DNS Resiliency from RFC Editor / Internet Engineering Task Force supports the following bounded statements:\n\nAfter an expired DNS record cannot be refreshed authoritatively, a recursive resolver may temporarily use the record as though it were unexpired. The research record locates this support at Section 4 (Standards Action), amended TTL definition.\nA stale response must assign each expired record a positive TTL; the recommended response TTL is 30 seconds. The research record locates this support at Section 4 (Standards Action), stale-response TTL.\nA serve-stale design bounds client wait, resolution work, failure rechecks, and maximum stale retention with separate timers. The research record locates this support at Section 5 (Example Method).\n\nThe source support ends with the statements listed above. Use them to examine authoritative zones, delegations, resolvers, caches, record owners, and the clients that consume the resulting answers in the applicable environment, not to imply a wider guarantee.\nWhat the source does not establish\nThis RFC evidence supports only the named DNS protocol decision; it does not prove Windows implementation support or a safe production configuration. No current deployment state or change approval follows from the source alone. Validate Windows DNS roles, Active Directory-integrated data, forwarding paths, time, routing, firewalls, and registrar or registry state, and treat examples or options as conditional inputs rather than defaults.\nApplicability questions\n\nFor source statement 1 at Section 4 (Standards Action), amended TTL definition, which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?\nFor source statement 2 at Section 4 (Standards Action), stale-response TTL, which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?\nFor source statement 3 at Section 5 (Example Method), which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?\nWithin authoritative zones, delegations, resolvers, caches, record owners, and the clients that consume the resulting answers, which versions, roles, and configuration states define the review population?\nCould Windows DNS roles, Active Directory-integrated data, forwarding paths, time, routing, firewalls, and registrar or registry state invalidate the test, hide a failure, or change applicability?\nWho owns the decision, and which observation requires stopping, escalation, or rollback?\n\nDSE recommendation:\nDSE recommends using the cited source as the evidence anchor for this decision. Make the source, asset scope, owner, and expected outcome explicit in the review record. Record the source location, examined part of authoritative zones, delegations, resolvers, caches, record owners, and the clients that consume the resulting answers, observed and expected states, owner, and reason for deviation.\nDo not move from citation to production in one step. Pilot the decision where practical, observe agreed signals, retain a reversal point, and verify Windows DNS roles, Active Directory-integrated data, forwarding paths, time, routing, firewalls, and registrar or registry state. Handle credentials, keys, recovery data, and personal information through approved secure channels.\nVerification and evidence\nA reviewer should be able to retrace the decision from Section 4 (Standards Action), amended TTL definition; Section 4 (Standards Action), stale-response TTL; Section 5 (Example Method) through zone data, packet captures, query transcripts, delegation checks, resolver configuration, and negative-answer behavior. Record what was collected, where, when, by whom, and which system or role it represents.\nPreserve both successful and failed observations, along with approval and rollback evidence. Avoid uncontrolled production experiments. Assign an expiry or event-driven recheck so the conclusion is not treated as permanent.\nOfficial references\n\nRFC 8767 — Serving Stale Data to Improve DNS Resiliency — RFC Editor / Internet Engineering Task Force",
        "content_markdown": "Use this document to connect an official requirement or behavior to observable evidence: Serve stale DNS data only inside explicit freshness and failure limits. Only the official source and traced locations below supply facts. Confirm applicability before acting.\n\n## Source fact:\n\nThe official [RFC 8767 — Serving Stale Data to Improve DNS Resiliency](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8767.html) from RFC Editor / Internet Engineering Task Force supports the following bounded statements:\n\n- After an expired DNS record cannot be refreshed authoritatively, a recursive resolver may temporarily use the record as though it were unexpired. The research record locates this support at Section 4 (Standards Action), amended TTL definition.\n\n- A stale response must assign each expired record a positive TTL; the recommended response TTL is 30 seconds. The research record locates this support at Section 4 (Standards Action), stale-response TTL.\n\n- A serve-stale design bounds client wait, resolution work, failure rechecks, and maximum stale retention with separate timers. The research record locates this support at Section 5 (Example Method).\n\nThe source support ends with the statements listed above. Use them to examine authoritative zones, delegations, resolvers, caches, record owners, and the clients that consume the resulting answers in the applicable environment, not to imply a wider guarantee.\n\n## What the source does not establish\n\nThis RFC evidence supports only the named DNS protocol decision; it does not prove Windows implementation support or a safe production configuration. No current deployment state or change approval follows from the source alone. Validate Windows DNS roles, Active Directory-integrated data, forwarding paths, time, routing, firewalls, and registrar or registry state, and treat examples or options as conditional inputs rather than defaults.\n\n## Applicability questions\n\n- For source statement 1 at Section 4 (Standards Action), amended TTL definition, which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?\n\n- For source statement 2 at Section 4 (Standards Action), stale-response TTL, which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?\n\n- For source statement 3 at Section 5 (Example Method), which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?\n\n- Within authoritative zones, delegations, resolvers, caches, record owners, and the clients that consume the resulting answers, which versions, roles, and configuration states define the review population?\n\n- Could Windows DNS roles, Active Directory-integrated data, forwarding paths, time, routing, firewalls, and registrar or registry state invalidate the test, hide a failure, or change applicability?\n\n- Who owns the decision, and which observation requires stopping, escalation, or rollback?\n\n## DSE recommendation:\n\nDSE recommends using the cited source as the evidence anchor for this decision. Make the source, asset scope, owner, and expected outcome explicit in the review record. Record the source location, examined part of authoritative zones, delegations, resolvers, caches, record owners, and the clients that consume the resulting answers, observed and expected states, owner, and reason for deviation.\n\nDo not move from citation to production in one step. Pilot the decision where practical, observe agreed signals, retain a reversal point, and verify Windows DNS roles, Active Directory-integrated data, forwarding paths, time, routing, firewalls, and registrar or registry state. Handle credentials, keys, recovery data, and personal information through approved secure channels.\n\n## Verification and evidence\n\nA reviewer should be able to retrace the decision from Section 4 (Standards Action), amended TTL definition; Section 4 (Standards Action), stale-response TTL; Section 5 (Example Method) through zone data, packet captures, query transcripts, delegation checks, resolver configuration, and negative-answer behavior. Record what was collected, where, when, by whom, and which system or role it represents.\n\nPreserve both successful and failed observations, along with approval and rollback evidence. Avoid uncontrolled production experiments. Assign an expiry or event-driven recheck so the conclusion is not treated as permanent.\n\n## Official references\n\n- [RFC 8767 — Serving Stale Data to Improve DNS Resiliency](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8767.html) — RFC Editor / Internet Engineering Task Force"
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