Reduce unnecessary internet exposure before it becomes an incident path

Exposure must be intentional

CISA’s Internet Exposure Reduction Guidance recommends identifying internet-accessible assets, deciding whether each exposure is necessary, mitigating the risk of services that must remain reachable, and reassessing routinely. The sequence matters. Teams cannot protect an exposure they do not know exists, and they should not spend years hardening a public interface that has no current business purpose.

Internet exposure can include more than websites. Remote administration, virtual private network gateways, file-transfer services, cloud consoles, test systems, management interfaces, and vendor support paths may all be externally reachable. A physical-security device or management server should not be assumed private simply because it is installed inside a facility.

Build an authorized view of the perimeter

Start with records the organization controls: public address ranges, domains, certificates, cloud accounts, firewall and gateway policies, remote-access platforms, vendor connections, and service inventories. Reconcile those records with observations from authorized external scanning or exposure-management services. Do not scan networks you do not own or lack permission to assess.

For every discovered service, record an owner, system purpose, location, platform and version, authentication method, data sensitivity, expected users, monitoring source, and business justification. Unknown assets require investigation; they should not be assigned a guessed purpose to make the list look complete.

Remove or restrict what is not required

Disable obsolete services and close paths left by retired projects or vendors.

Move administrative interfaces behind an approved remote-access or policy-enforcement layer where supported.

Restrict source networks, users, and time periods when the business workflow permits.

Replace default credentials and retire unsupported products through a documented plan.

Coordinate changes with monitoring, cloud, application, and physical-security owners.

Removal must still be treated as a production change. Remote monitoring, hosted services, mobile applications, and emergency support may depend on a path that is not obvious from a firewall name. Define tests and recovery steps before changing exposure.

Protect exposure that remains

CISA calls out measures such as current patches, multifactor authentication where possible, monitored access through a jump host, and ingress and egress monitoring. Apply the controls supported by the exact service and its architecture. Also confirm logging, alert ownership, certificate renewal, account review, backups, and an incident response contact. An internet-facing service should have a shorter route from alert to accountable human than an internal low-risk asset.

Make reassessment routine

Public exposure changes when a cloud workload is created, a vendor opens support access, a certificate is issued, or a firewall exception outlives its project. Compare the authorized inventory with current observations on a defined cadence and after material network changes. Track findings to closure, including accepted exceptions with an owner and review date. The goal is not a one-time clean scan; it is a perimeter whose public services are known, justified, supported, and monitored.