# Keep protected machine accounts disabled until Microsoft resolves rotation > Use Credential Guard protected machine accounts in Windows Server 2025 to review this narrow operational decision without extending the source beyond its stated scope. - Canonical URL: https://update.dsesecurity.com/updates/keep-protected-machine-accounts-disabled-until-fixed/ - Publisher: Detection Systems & Engineering (DSE Security) - Author: DSE Security Editorial Team - Published: 2026-08-27T12:14:39+00:00 - Modified: 2026-08-27T12:58:58+00:00 - Last reviewed by DSE: 2026-08-26 - Resource type: Checklist - DSE priority: Advisory - Topics: IT, Microsoft 365 & Identity, Networks & Infrastructure - Reading time: 3 minutes ## What you need to know Use Credential Guard protected machine accounts in Windows Server 2025 to review this narrow operational decision without extending the source beyond its stated scope. ## Potentially affected Teams, systems, services, or facilities within the stated scope of Credential Guard protected machine accounts in Windows Server 2025 ## DSE recommendation Compare the observed state with the cited official source, document applicability and exceptions, and test any approved change with rollback safeguards. ## Article Treat this document as a focused evidence review: Keep protected machine accounts disabled until Microsoft resolves rotation. Only the official source and traced locations below supply facts. Confirm applicability before acting. ## Source fact: The official [Credential Guard protected machine accounts in Windows Server 2025](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/delegated-managed-service-accounts/credential-guard-protected-machine-accounts) from Microsoft supports the following bounded statements: - Microsoft states that Credential Guard protected machine accounts are temporarily disabled because of a Kerberos machine-password rotation issue. The research record locates this support at Opening important notice. - FAST and managed service accounts increasingly depend on machine-account identity. The research record locates this support at Opening overview. Only the traced statements above are asserted as source facts. Apply the review to forests, domains, controllers, directory partitions, trusts, sites, replication links, service accounts, and delegated roles after confirming that the source and deployed context match. ## What the source does not establish This is status-sensitive guidance; recheck the official page before any deployment decision. Do not read the source as proof of implementation or permission to change production. Its guidance remains conditional on Windows DNS, time synchronization, network reachability, PKI, backups, virtualization safeguards, and privileged identity and the environment’s recorded constraints. ## Applicability questions - For source statement 1 at Opening important notice, which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here? - For source statement 2 at Opening overview, which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here? - What inventory proves which parts of forests, domains, controllers, directory partitions, trusts, sites, replication links, service accounts, and delegated roles are in and out of scope? - Which condition in Windows DNS, time synchronization, network reachability, PKI, backups, virtualization safeguards, and privileged identity must be healthy before evidence is trustworthy? - What result would disprove the working assumption and return the issue to the owner? ## DSE recommendation: DSE recommends using the cited source as the evidence anchor for this decision. Begin by recording scope and current state before deciding whether a change is warranted. Record the source location, examined part of forests, domains, controllers, directory partitions, trusts, sites, replication links, service accounts, and delegated roles, observed and expected states, owner, and reason for deviation. Do not move from citation to production in one step. Pilot the decision where practical, observe agreed signals, retain a reversal point, and verify Windows DNS, time synchronization, network reachability, PKI, backups, virtualization safeguards, and privileged identity. Handle credentials, keys, recovery data, and personal information through approved secure channels. ## Verification and evidence Keep the source locations Opening important notice; Opening overview adjacent to the sanitized artifacts used for comparison. Prefer directory and policy exports, replication and locator tests, event logs, trust state, role ownership, and controlled authentication tests, with enough identity and timing data for an independent recheck. Retain the starting state, authorization, execution record, outcome, deviation, and final state as one review package. Move disruptive checks to an approved test path. Reopen the decision when versions, design, dependencies, ownership, or official guidance changes. ## Official references - [Credential Guard protected machine accounts in Windows Server 2025](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/delegated-managed-service-accounts/credential-guard-protected-machine-accounts) — Microsoft ## Primary reference - Name: Credential Guard protected machine accounts in Windows Server 2025 - Authority: Microsoft Learn - URL: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/delegated-managed-service-accounts/credential-guard-protected-machine-accounts - Source publication date: 2025-04-11 ## Citation and use Preferred citation: “Keep protected machine accounts disabled until Microsoft resolves rotation,” DSE Security, https://update.dsesecurity.com/updates/keep-protected-machine-accounts-disabled-until-fixed/ Publishing principles: https://update.dsesecurity.com/updates/dse-updates-editorial-methodology/ Usage and citation policy: https://update.dsesecurity.com/usage/ Copyright © 2026 Detection Systems & Engineering. 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