# Review Appendix H - Securing Local Administrator Accounts and Groups before AD/DNS changes > Use Appendix H - Securing Local Administrator Accounts and Groups to review this narrow operational decision without extending the source beyond its stated scope. - Canonical URL: https://update.dsesecurity.com/updates/review-appendix-h-securing-local-administrator-accounts-and-groups-before-ad-dns-changes/ - Publisher: Detection Systems & Engineering (DSE Security) - Author: DSE Security Editorial Team - Published: 2026-08-27T17:06:31+00:00 - Modified: 2026-08-27T17:11:09+00:00 - Last reviewed by DSE: 2026-08-27 - Resource type: Playbook - DSE priority: Advisory - Topics: Cybersecurity, Microsoft 365 & Identity, Networks & Infrastructure - Reading time: 3 minutes ## What you need to know Use Appendix H - Securing Local Administrator Accounts and Groups to review this narrow operational decision without extending the source beyond its stated scope. ## Potentially affected Teams, systems, services, or facilities within the stated scope of Appendix H - Securing Local Administrator Accounts and Groups ## DSE recommendation Compare the observed state with the cited official source, document applicability and exceptions, and test any approved change with rollback safeguards. ## Article Keep this document to one review outcome: Review Appendix H – Securing Local Administrator Accounts and Groups before AD/DNS changes. Only the official source and traced locations below supply facts. Confirm applicability before acting. ## Source fact: The official [Appendix H – Securing Local Administrator Accounts and Groups](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/plan/security-best-practices/Appendix-H--Securing-Local-Administrator-Accounts-and-Groups) from Microsoft supports the following bounded statements: - At Appendix H: Securing Local Administrator Accounts and Groups, Microsoft states: “On all versions of Windows currently in mainstream support, the local Administrator account is disabled by default, which makes the account unusable for pass-the-hash and other credential theft attacks.” The research record locates this support at Appendix H: Securing Local Administrator Accounts and Groups. - At Appendix H: Securing Local Administrator Accounts and Groups, Microsoft states: “However, in environments that contain legacy operating systems or in which local Administrator accounts have been enabled, these accounts can be used as previously described to propagate compromise across member servers and workstations.” The research record locates this support at Appendix H: Securing Local Administrator Accounts and Groups. These statements are the factual basis for this document. Do not extend them into a broader assurance. Review forests, domains, controllers, directory partitions, trusts, sites, replication links, service accounts, and delegated roles only where the source and recorded environment align. ## What the source does not establish The cited page and retained statements do not establish the current state of any DSE or customer environment, prove that the documented configuration is applicable, or authorize a production change. Confirm supported versions, dependencies, and the current live source before use. The citation is not a substitute for observed state, authorization, compliance evidence, or dependency health. Examine Windows DNS, time synchronization, network reachability, PKI, backups, virtualization safeguards, and privileged identity before translating the source into an operational decision. ## Applicability questions - For source statement 1 at Appendix H: Securing Local Administrator Accounts and Groups, which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here? - For source statement 2 at Appendix H: Securing Local Administrator Accounts and Groups, which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here? - Within forests, domains, controllers, directory partitions, trusts, sites, replication links, service accounts, and delegated roles, which versions, roles, and configuration states define the review population? - Could Windows DNS, time synchronization, network reachability, PKI, backups, virtualization safeguards, and privileged identity invalidate the test, hide a failure, or change applicability? - Who owns the decision, and which observation requires stopping, escalation, or rollback? ## DSE recommendation: DSE recommends using the cited source as the evidence anchor for this decision. Start with applicability, then compare the observed state with the cited source. Record the source location, examined part of forests, domains, controllers, directory partitions, trusts, sites, replication links, service accounts, and delegated roles, observed and expected states, owner, and reason for deviation. For an approved change, define prerequisites, a limited test path, success and stop conditions, monitoring, and rollback. Check Windows DNS, time synchronization, network reachability, PKI, backups, virtualization safeguards, and privileged identity in design order. Protect credentials, keys, recovery material, personal data, and sensitive topology in evidence. ## Verification and evidence Evidence should let another reviewer reproduce this decision. Retain observations beside the traced locations Appendix H: Securing Local Administrator Accounts and Groups; Appendix H: Securing Local Administrator Accounts and Groups. Favor directory and policy exports, replication and locator tests, event logs, trust state, role ownership, and controlled authentication tests, linked to stable identifiers, time, and operator. Label this evidence set DSE-20260827-055 so observations, approvals, exceptions, and later rechecks cannot be substituted from another source review. Retain the starting state, authorization, execution record, outcome, deviation, and final state as one review package. Move disruptive checks to an approved test path. Reopen the decision when versions, design, dependencies, ownership, or official guidance changes. ## Official references - [Appendix H – Securing Local Administrator Accounts and Groups](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/plan/security-best-practices/Appendix-H--Securing-Local-Administrator-Accounts-and-Groups) — Microsoft ## Primary reference - Name: Appendix H - Securing Local Administrator Accounts and Groups - Authority: Microsoft Learn - URL: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/plan/security-best-practices/Appendix-H--Securing-Local-Administrator-Accounts-and-Groups - Source publication date: Not stated by the source ## Citation and use Preferred citation: “Review Appendix H - Securing Local Administrator Accounts and Groups before AD/DNS changes,” DSE Security, https://update.dsesecurity.com/updates/review-appendix-h-securing-local-administrator-accounts-and-groups-before-ad-dns-changes/ Publishing principles: https://update.dsesecurity.com/updates/dse-updates-editorial-methodology/ Usage and citation policy: https://update.dsesecurity.com/usage/ Copyright © 2026 Detection Systems & Engineering. 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