# Scope Appendix E - Securing Enterprise Admins Groups in Active Directory in observed AD/DNS state > Use Appendix E - Securing Enterprise Admins Groups in Active Directory to review this narrow operational decision without extending the source beyond its stated scope. - Canonical URL: https://update.dsesecurity.com/updates/scope-appendix-e-securing-enterprise-admins-groups-in-active-directory-in-observed-ad-dns-state/ - Publisher: Detection Systems & Engineering (DSE Security) - Author: DSE Security Editorial Team - Published: 2026-08-27T17:06:45+00:00 - Modified: 2026-08-27T17:07:31+00:00 - Last reviewed by DSE: 2026-08-27 - Resource type: Briefing - DSE priority: Advisory - Topics: Cybersecurity, Microsoft 365 & Identity, Networks & Infrastructure - Reading time: 3 minutes ## What you need to know Use Appendix E - Securing Enterprise Admins Groups in Active Directory to review this narrow operational decision without extending the source beyond its stated scope. ## Potentially affected Teams, systems, services, or facilities within the stated scope of Appendix E - Securing Enterprise Admins Groups in Active Directory ## DSE recommendation Compare the observed state with the cited official source, document applicability and exceptions, and test any approved change with rollback safeguards. ## Article Use this document to resolve one bounded operational decision: Scope Appendix E – Securing Enterprise Admins Groups in Active Directory in observed AD/DNS state. Only the official source and traced locations below supply facts. Confirm applicability before acting. ## Source fact: The official [Appendix E – Securing Enterprise Admins Groups in Active Directory](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/plan/security-best-practices/Appendix-E--Securing-Enterprise-Admins-Groups-in-Active-Directory) from Microsoft supports the following bounded statements: - At Appendix E: Securing Enterprise Admins Groups in Active Directory, Microsoft states: “Enterprise Admins are, by default, members of the Administrators group in each domain in the forest.” The research record locates this support at Appendix E: Securing Enterprise Admins Groups in Active Directory. - At Appendix E: Securing Enterprise Admins Groups in Active Directory, Microsoft states: “You should not remove the EA group from the Administrators groups in each domain because in the event of a forest disaster recovery scenario, EA rights will likely be required.” The research record locates this support at Appendix E: Securing Enterprise Admins Groups in Active Directory. The source support ends with the statements listed above. Use them to examine forests, domains, controllers, directory partitions, trusts, sites, replication links, service accounts, and delegated roles in the applicable environment, not to imply a wider guarantee. ## What the source does not establish The cited page and retained statements do not establish the current state of any DSE or customer environment, prove that the documented configuration is applicable, or authorize a production change. Confirm supported versions, dependencies, and the current live source before use. No current deployment state or change approval follows from the source alone. Validate Windows DNS, time synchronization, network reachability, PKI, backups, virtualization safeguards, and privileged identity, and treat examples or options as conditional inputs rather than defaults. ## Applicability questions - For source statement 1 at Appendix E: Securing Enterprise Admins Groups in Active Directory, which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here? - For source statement 2 at Appendix E: Securing Enterprise Admins Groups in Active Directory, which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here? - Within forests, domains, controllers, directory partitions, trusts, sites, replication links, service accounts, and delegated roles, which versions, roles, and configuration states define the review population? - Could Windows DNS, time synchronization, network reachability, PKI, backups, virtualization safeguards, and privileged identity invalidate the test, hide a failure, or change applicability? - Who owns the decision, and which observation requires stopping, escalation, or rollback? ## DSE recommendation: DSE recommends using the cited source as the evidence anchor for this decision. Make the source, asset scope, owner, and expected outcome explicit in the review record. Record the source location, examined part of forests, domains, controllers, directory partitions, trusts, sites, replication links, service accounts, and delegated roles, observed and expected states, owner, and reason for deviation. If the review warrants change, use a bounded implementation with prerequisites, test population, monitoring, abort criteria, and a rehearsed reversal. Sequence checks for Windows DNS, time synchronization, network reachability, PKI, backups, virtualization safeguards, and privileged identity and sanitize protected material before retention. ## Verification and evidence A reviewer should be able to retrace the decision from Appendix E: Securing Enterprise Admins Groups in Active Directory; Appendix E: Securing Enterprise Admins Groups in Active Directory through directory and policy exports, replication and locator tests, event logs, trust state, role ownership, and controlled authentication tests. Record what was collected, where, when, by whom, and which system or role it represents. Label this evidence set DSE-20260827-041 so observations, approvals, exceptions, and later rechecks cannot be substituted from another source review. Record the decision even when no change is made, including uncertainty and the next trigger. Use safe testing conditions for disruptive work, preserve rollback proof, and revisit the conclusion after relevant platform, dependency, vendor, or ownership changes. ## Official references - [Appendix E – Securing Enterprise Admins Groups in Active Directory](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/plan/security-best-practices/Appendix-E--Securing-Enterprise-Admins-Groups-in-Active-Directory) — Microsoft ## Primary reference - Name: Appendix E - Securing Enterprise Admins Groups in Active Directory - Authority: Microsoft Learn - URL: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/plan/security-best-practices/Appendix-E--Securing-Enterprise-Admins-Groups-in-Active-Directory - Source publication date: Not stated by the source ## Citation and use Preferred citation: “Scope Appendix E - Securing Enterprise Admins Groups in Active Directory in observed AD/DNS state,” DSE Security, https://update.dsesecurity.com/updates/scope-appendix-e-securing-enterprise-admins-groups-in-active-directory-in-observed-ad-dns-state/ Publishing principles: https://update.dsesecurity.com/updates/dse-updates-editorial-methodology/ Usage and citation policy: https://update.dsesecurity.com/usage/ Copyright © 2026 Detection Systems & Engineering. 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