# Separate Defender for Identity directory reads from remediation permissions > Use Directory Service Accounts for Microsoft Defender for Identity to review this narrow operational decision without extending the source beyond its stated scope. - Canonical URL: https://update.dsesecurity.com/updates/separate-directory-reads-from-remediation-permissions/ - Publisher: Detection Systems & Engineering (DSE Security) - Author: DSE Security Editorial Team - Published: 2026-08-27T12:13:30+00:00 - Modified: 2026-08-27T13:01:31+00:00 - Last reviewed by DSE: 2026-08-26 - Resource type: Briefing - DSE priority: Advisory - Topics: Cybersecurity, IT, Microsoft 365 & Identity - Reading time: 3 minutes ## What you need to know Use Directory Service Accounts for Microsoft Defender for Identity to review this narrow operational decision without extending the source beyond its stated scope. ## Potentially affected Teams, systems, services, or facilities within the stated scope of Directory Service Accounts for Microsoft Defender for Identity ## DSE recommendation Compare the observed state with the cited official source, document applicability and exceptions, and test any approved change with rollback safeguards. ## Article Use this document to resolve one bounded operational decision: Separate Defender for Identity directory reads from remediation permissions. Only the official source and traced locations below supply facts. Confirm applicability before acting. ## Source fact: The official [Directory Service Accounts for Microsoft Defender for Identity](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-for-identity/deploy/directory-service-accounts) from Microsoft supports the following bounded statements: - A Directory Service Account reads Active Directory data by querying objects, tracking changes, and resolving entities, while the action account performs remediation. The research record locates this support at Opening overview. - Directory Service Accounts apply only to sensor v2.x; sensor v3.x uses LocalSystem and does not use DSA or gMSA configuration. The research record locates this support at Version applicability paragraph. These statements are the factual basis for this document. Do not extend them into a broader assurance. Review Defender for Identity workspaces, sensors, directory-service accounts, action accounts, network paths, roles, and deployment health only where the source and recorded environment align. ## What the source does not establish Configure only documented read permissions; this brief does not define action-account delegation. No current deployment state or change approval follows from the source alone. Validate Active Directory, Windows DNS, time, certificates, domain-controller resources, network capture, cloud connectivity, and security operations, and treat examples or options as conditional inputs rather than defaults. ## Applicability questions - For source statement 1 at Opening overview, which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here? - For source statement 2 at Version applicability paragraph, which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here? - Which deployed instance of Defender for Identity workspaces, sensors, directory-service accounts, action accounts, network paths, roles, and deployment health will be compared with the source, and why that instance? - How will the review distinguish a source mismatch from a failure in Active Directory, Windows DNS, time, certificates, domain-controller resources, network capture, cloud connectivity, and security operations? - Who approves the conclusion, exception, test window, and rollback threshold? ## DSE recommendation: DSE recommends using the cited source as the evidence anchor for this decision. Start with applicability, then compare the observed state with the cited source. Record the source location, examined part of Defender for Identity workspaces, sensors, directory-service accounts, action accounts, network paths, roles, and deployment health, observed and expected states, owner, and reason for deviation. If the review warrants change, use a bounded implementation with prerequisites, test population, monitoring, abort criteria, and a rehearsed reversal. Sequence checks for Active Directory, Windows DNS, time, certificates, domain-controller resources, network capture, cloud connectivity, and security operations and sanitize protected material before retention. ## Verification and evidence Keep the source locations Opening overview; Version applicability paragraph adjacent to the sanitized artifacts used for comparison. Prefer sensor inventory, service and action-account permissions, health alerts, connectivity tests, portal state, and controlled detection tests, with enough identity and timing data for an independent recheck. Close the review only when the evidence, exception handling, resulting action, and after-state are linked. Schedule a new review after material technical, organizational, incident, or source changes; today’s observation is not a continuing guarantee. ## Official references - [Directory Service Accounts for Microsoft Defender for Identity](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-for-identity/deploy/directory-service-accounts) — Microsoft ## Primary reference - Name: Directory Service Accounts for Microsoft Defender for Identity - Authority: Microsoft Learn - URL: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-for-identity/deploy/directory-service-accounts - Source publication date: 2024-01-16 ## Citation and use Preferred citation: “Separate Defender for Identity directory reads from remediation permissions,” DSE Security, https://update.dsesecurity.com/updates/separate-directory-reads-from-remediation-permissions/ Publishing principles: https://update.dsesecurity.com/updates/dse-updates-editorial-methodology/ Usage and citation policy: https://update.dsesecurity.com/usage/ Copyright © 2026 Detection Systems & Engineering. 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