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Cybersecurity

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DSE visual briefNetworks & infrastructure

Require transparent DNS proxy behavior through broadband gateways

A simple gateway DNS proxy should forward the complete request and response verbatim so new extensions behave as if the proxy were absent. A proxy must pass packets with unknown DNS flags, record types, classes, or uncompressed labels instead of rejecting them.

Published Reviewed 3 min readBy DSE Security Editorial Team
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DSE visual briefIdentity & cloud

Resolve DHCP name conflicts against the existing DHCID identity

A DHCP updater associates an FQDN with one client’s identity by adding a DHCID record alongside the client’s A, AAAA, or PTR records. If the FQDN exists, the updater requires a matching DHCID record before replacing address records for the same client.

Published Reviewed 3 min readBy DSE Security Editorial Team
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DSE visual briefNetworks & infrastructure

Resolve link-local names with mDNS probing, scope, and response rules

Before claiming a unique link-local record, an mDNS responder sends three probes and treats any live answer with that name as a conflict. Simultaneous probes compare proposed records, and the lexicographically later record wins the tiebreak.

Published Reviewed 3 min readBy DSE Security Editorial Team
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DSE visual briefNetworks & infrastructure

Round-trip Unicode labels through Punycode without display-policy assumptions

Punycode is a Bootstring encoding that represents a sequence from a large code-point set using only a smaller basic code-point set. The encoder and decoder must detect arithmetic overflow or enforce equivalent input limits; invalid input is not assumed to fit IDNA label bounds.

Published Reviewed 3 min readBy DSE Security Editorial Team
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DSE visual briefNetworks & infrastructure

Separate DNS-SD enumeration from SRV reachability and TXT metadata

DNS-SD enumeration queries a service-type name for PTR records whose targets are the available service-instance names. After choosing an instance, a client queries that instance name for SRV and TXT records; SRV supplies target host and port, while TXT supplies service metadata.

Published Reviewed 3 min readBy DSE Security Editorial Team
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DSE visual briefNetworks & infrastructure

Serve designated private reverse zones locally to stop query leakage

Unless configured otherwise, a resolver serves the designated reverse zones locally and returns authoritative name errors for names below each zone. Implementations must allow local serving to be disabled and should support enabling or disabling it one zone at a time.

Published Reviewed 3 min readBy DSE Security Editorial Team
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DSE visual briefNetworks & infrastructure

Serve stale DNS data only inside explicit freshness and failure limits

After an expired DNS record cannot be refreshed authoritatively, a recursive resolver may temporarily use the record as though it were unexpired. A stale response must assign each expired record a positive TTL; the recommended response TTL is 30 seconds.

Published Reviewed 3 min readBy DSE Security Editorial Team
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DSE visual briefNetworks & infrastructure

Set IDNA2008 terminology and protocol boundaries before implementation

IDNA-aware applications recognize three valid label categories: A-labels, U-labels, and non-reserved LDH labels. An A-label is the ASCII-compatible form of a complete IDNA label, begins with xn--, and must decode to a valid U-label.

Published Reviewed 3 min readBy DSE Security Editorial Team
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DSE visual briefNetworks & infrastructure

Stop fast DNS retries and recursion loops identified by RFC 1536

A DNS client should base retries on server round-trip estimates, cycle among servers, and increase retry timeouts exponentially. Resolvers should cap the referral and CNAME chains they follow and avoid self-referring servers so malformed data cannot create recursion loops.

Published Reviewed 3 min readBy DSE Security Editorial Team
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