Choose automatic or manual sensor activation from the domain-controller inventory

Treat this document as a focused evidence review: Choose automatic or manual sensor activation from the domain-controller inventory. Only the official source and traced locations below supply facts. Confirm applicability before acting.

Source fact:

The official Activate the Defender for Identity sensor v3.x on a domain controller from Microsoft supports the following bounded statements:

• Microsoft calls for activating the sensor on all applicable servers and directs older or non-domain-controller identity roles to sensor v2.x instead. The research record locates this support at Opening applicability paragraph.
• Eligible domain controllers can be activated automatically when discovered or manually by selecting servers from the inventory. The research record locates this support at Activation options section.

The source support ends with the statements listed above. Use them to examine Defender for Identity workspaces, sensors, directory-service accounts, action accounts, network paths, roles, and deployment health in the applicable environment, not to imply a wider guarantee.

What the source does not establish

Activation state is not evidence of complete event auditing, identity configuration, or telemetry validation. It does not establish a deployment’s current state, authorize a production change, prove compliance, or show that Active Directory, Windows DNS, time, certificates, domain-controller resources, network capture, cloud connectivity, and security operations are healthy. Documented options are review inputs, not universal mandates.

Applicability questions

• For source statement 1 at Opening applicability paragraph, which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?
• For source statement 2 at Activation options section, which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?
• Which deployed instance of Defender for Identity workspaces, sensors, directory-service accounts, action accounts, network paths, roles, and deployment health will be compared with the source, and why that instance?
• How will the review distinguish a source mismatch from a failure in Active Directory, Windows DNS, time, certificates, domain-controller resources, network capture, cloud connectivity, and security operations?
• Who approves the conclusion, exception, test window, and rollback threshold?

DSE recommendation:

DSE recommends using the cited source as the evidence anchor for this decision. Make the source, asset scope, owner, and expected outcome explicit in the review record. Record the source location, examined part of Defender for Identity workspaces, sensors, directory-service accounts, action accounts, network paths, roles, and deployment health, observed and expected states, owner, and reason for deviation.

If the review warrants change, use a bounded implementation with prerequisites, test population, monitoring, abort criteria, and a rehearsed reversal. Sequence checks for Active Directory, Windows DNS, time, certificates, domain-controller resources, network capture, cloud connectivity, and security operations and sanitize protected material before retention.

Verification and evidence

Evidence should let another reviewer reproduce this decision. Retain observations beside the traced locations Opening applicability paragraph; Activation options section. Favor sensor inventory, service and action-account permissions, health alerts, connectivity tests, portal state, and controlled detection tests, linked to stable identifiers, time, and operator.

Retain the starting state, authorization, execution record, outcome, deviation, and final state as one review package. Move disruptive checks to an approved test path. Reopen the decision when versions, design, dependencies, ownership, or official guidance changes.

Official references

• Activate the Defender for Identity sensor v3.x on a domain controller — Microsoft