What you need to know
Use 49 CFR 1542.209 -- Airport Security to review this narrow operational decision without extending the source beyond its stated scope.
Potentially affected
Teams, systems, services, or facilities within the stated scope of 49 CFR 1542.209 -- Airport Security
DSE recommendation
Compare the observed state with the cited official source, document applicability and exceptions, and test any approved change with rollback safeguards.
Use this document to resolve one bounded operational decision: Complete fingerprint-based history checks before granting required unescorted airport access. Only the official source and traced locations below supply facts. Confirm applicability before acting.
Source fact:
The official 49 CFR 1542.209 — Airport Security from Transportation Security Administration via eCFR supports the following bounded statements:
- Under 49 CFR 1542, the rule requires that except as provided in paragraph (m) of this section, each airport operator ensure that no individual is granted unescorted access authority unless the individual has undergone a fingerprint-based CHRC that does not disclose that he or she has a disqualifying criminal offense, as described in paragraph (d) of this section. The research record locates this support at 49 CFR 1542.209(b) (eCFR anchor p-1542.209(b)).
- Under 49 CFR 1542, notwithstanding the requirements of this section, an airport operator may authorize the following individuals to have unescorted access authority: an individual who has been continuously employed by an aircraft operator or aircraft operator contractor, in a position with authority to perform screening functions, provided the grant for his or her authority to perform screening functions was based upon a fingerprint-based CHRC through TSA or FAA. The research record locates this support at 49 CFR 1542.209(m)(2)(ii), read with 49 CFR 1542.209(m)(2) (eCFR anchor p-1542.209(m)(2)(ii)).
Only the traced statements above are asserted as source facts. Apply the review to credentials, readers, controllers, panels, door hardware, access decisions, monitoring, and life-safety interfaces after confirming that the source and deployed context match.
What the source does not establish
Applies only to airport operators, tenants, personnel, and areas covered by 49 CFR part 1542 and the cited section. Confirm the TSA-approved security program and current directives; this is not legal advice or a universal access-control standard. Do not read the source as proof of implementation or permission to change production. Its guidance remains conditional on identity sources, DNS where used, time, networks, power, fire systems, monitoring, and authorized operators and the environment’s recorded constraints.
Applicability questions
- For source statement 1 at 49 CFR 1542.209(b) (eCFR anchor p-1542.209(b)), which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?
- For source statement 2 at 49 CFR 1542.209(m)(2)(ii), read with 49 CFR 1542.209(m)(2) (eCFR anchor p-1542.209(m)(2)(ii)), which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?
- Which owner can attest to the recorded state of credentials, readers, controllers, panels, door hardware, access decisions, monitoring, and life-safety interfaces, including exceptions?
- What baseline for identity sources, DNS where used, time, networks, power, fire systems, monitoring, and authorized operators must accompany the source-specific observation?
- Which success, stop, and escalation criteria are written before testing begins?
DSE recommendation:
DSE recommends using the cited source as the evidence anchor for this decision. Begin by recording scope and current state before deciding whether a change is warranted. Record the source location, examined part of credentials, readers, controllers, panels, door hardware, access decisions, monitoring, and life-safety interfaces, observed and expected states, owner, and reason for deviation.
An implementation decision needs an owner, approved window, prechecks, observable outcome, stop authority, and rollback path. Validate identity sources, DNS where used, time, networks, power, fire systems, monitoring, and authorized operators before and after the test, and store only sanitized operational evidence.
Verification and evidence
Tie each conclusion back to 49 CFR 1542.209(b) (eCFR anchor p-1542.209(b)); 49 CFR 1542.209(m)(2)(ii), read with 49 CFR 1542.209(m)(2) (eCFR anchor p-1542.209(m)(2)(ii)) and to observable material such as approved configuration exports, access-event tests, controller state, door inspections, alarm handling, and exception records. Preserve provenance and stable identifiers without copying secrets into the evidence set.
Preserve both successful and failed observations, along with approval and rollback evidence. Avoid uncontrolled production experiments. Assign an expiry or event-driven recheck so the conclusion is not treated as permanent.
Official references
- 49 CFR 1542.209 — Airport Security — Transportation Security Administration via eCFR
Review the official source
49 CFR 1542.209 -- Airport Security · Verified August 26, 2026
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