Configure advanced Windows auditing before expecting identity detections

Frame this document as a source-led configuration and assurance check: Configure advanced Windows auditing before expecting identity detections. Only the official source and traced locations below supply facts. Confirm applicability before acting.

Source fact:

The official Configure Windows event auditing from Microsoft supports the following bounded statements:

• Defender for Identity sensors parse specific Windows event logs from domain controllers, AD FS, AD CS, and Microsoft Entra Connect servers, which must have the correct advanced audit policy settings. The research record locates this support at Opening overview.
• Defender for Identity raises health alerts when it detects incorrect Windows event auditing configurations. The research record locates this support at Auditing configuration guidance.

Only the traced statements above are asserted as source facts. Apply the review to Defender for Identity workspaces, sensors, directory-service accounts, action accounts, network paths, roles, and deployment health after confirming that the source and deployed context match.

What the source does not establish

Apply audit policy through controlled Group Policy testing; a configured setting does not prove events are generated, transported, or retained. No current deployment state or change approval follows from the source alone. Validate Active Directory, Windows DNS, time, certificates, domain-controller resources, network capture, cloud connectivity, and security operations, and treat examples or options as conditional inputs rather than defaults.

Applicability questions

• For source statement 1 at Opening overview, which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?
• For source statement 2 at Auditing configuration guidance, which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?
• Which deployed instance of Defender for Identity workspaces, sensors, directory-service accounts, action accounts, network paths, roles, and deployment health will be compared with the source, and why that instance?
• How will the review distinguish a source mismatch from a failure in Active Directory, Windows DNS, time, certificates, domain-controller resources, network capture, cloud connectivity, and security operations?
• Who approves the conclusion, exception, test window, and rollback threshold?

DSE recommendation:

DSE recommends using the cited source as the evidence anchor for this decision. Begin by recording scope and current state before deciding whether a change is warranted. Record the source location, examined part of Defender for Identity workspaces, sensors, directory-service accounts, action accounts, network paths, roles, and deployment health, observed and expected states, owner, and reason for deviation.

An implementation decision needs an owner, approved window, prechecks, observable outcome, stop authority, and rollback path. Validate Active Directory, Windows DNS, time, certificates, domain-controller resources, network capture, cloud connectivity, and security operations before and after the test, and store only sanitized operational evidence.

Verification and evidence

A reviewer should be able to retrace the decision from Opening overview; Auditing configuration guidance through sensor inventory, service and action-account permissions, health alerts, connectivity tests, portal state, and controlled detection tests. Record what was collected, where, when, by whom, and which system or role it represents.

Retain the starting state, authorization, execution record, outcome, deviation, and final state as one review package. Move disruptive checks to an approved test path. Reopen the decision when versions, design, dependencies, ownership, or official guidance changes.

Official references

• Configure Windows event auditing — Microsoft