Deploy the vulnerable driver blocklist through supported App Control

Frame this document as a source-led configuration and assurance check: Deploy the vulnerable driver blocklist through supported App Control. Only the official source and traced locations below supply facts. Confirm applicability before acting.

Source fact:

The official Microsoft recommended driver block rules from Microsoft supports the following bounded statements:

• Attackers can exploit vulnerabilities in legitimate signed kernel drivers to run malicious code in the kernel. The research record locates this support at Opening overview.
• Microsoft publishes a vulnerable-driver blocklist that can be applied with App Control mechanisms. The research record locates this support at Sections: Microsoft vulnerable driver blocklist; Blocking vulnerable drivers using App Control.

Keep the evidence boundary at these traced claims. They support a review of Windows security controls, protected identities, audit policy, telemetry, exclusions, administrative roles, and response workflows; they do not support conclusions outside the source’s stated conditions.

What the source does not establish

Audit hardware and software compatibility before enforcing updated driver blocks. It does not establish a deployment’s current state, authorize a production change, prove compliance, or show that Active Directory, Windows DNS, certificate trust, time, endpoint management, telemetry pipelines, and security operations are healthy. Documented options are review inputs, not universal mandates.

Applicability questions

• For source statement 1 at Opening overview, which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?
• For source statement 2 at Sections: Microsoft vulnerable driver blocklist; Blocking vulnerable drivers using App Control, which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?
• Which deployed instance of Windows security controls, protected identities, audit policy, telemetry, exclusions, administrative roles, and response workflows will be compared with the source, and why that instance?
• How will the review distinguish a source mismatch from a failure in Active Directory, Windows DNS, certificate trust, time, endpoint management, telemetry pipelines, and security operations?
• Who approves the conclusion, exception, test window, and rollback threshold?

DSE recommendation:

DSE recommends using the cited source as the evidence anchor for this decision. Anchor the review in the cited section and keep observation separate from interpretation. Record the source location, examined part of Windows security controls, protected identities, audit policy, telemetry, exclusions, administrative roles, and response workflows, observed and expected states, owner, and reason for deviation.

Translate the conclusion into change control only after documenting dependencies, impact, test method, expected signals, failure signals, and restoration steps. Include Active Directory, Windows DNS, certificate trust, time, endpoint management, telemetry pipelines, and security operations, while excluding secrets and sensitive personal or topology data from ordinary tickets.

Verification and evidence

Tie each conclusion back to Opening overview; Sections: Microsoft vulnerable driver blocklist; Blocking vulnerable drivers using App Control and to observable material such as policy and feature state, security events, test detections, administrative assignments, exception approvals, and response tickets. Preserve provenance and stable identifiers without copying secrets into the evidence set.

Retain the starting state, authorization, execution record, outcome, deviation, and final state as one review package. Move disruptive checks to an approved test path. Reopen the decision when versions, design, dependencies, ownership, or official guidance changes.

Official references

• Microsoft recommended driver block rules — Microsoft