Evaluate reactor physical protection against radiological-sabotage objectives

Use this document to resolve one bounded operational decision: Evaluate reactor physical protection against radiological-sabotage objectives. Only the official source and traced locations below supply facts. Confirm applicability before acting.

Source fact:

The official 10 CFR 73.55 – Nuclear power reactor physical protection from U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission via eCFR supports the following bounded statements:

• Under 10 CFR 73, consistent with the physical protection program design requirements of section 73.55(b), and in accordance with the site-specific analysis, the licensee must establish and maintain vehicle control measures, as necessary, to protect against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage vehicle bomb assault. The research record locates this support at 10 CFR 73.55(e)(10) (eCFR anchor p-73.55(e)(10)).
• Under 10 CFR 73, to satisfy the general performance objective of paragraph (b)(1) of this section, the physical protection program must protect against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage as stated in section 73.1. The research record locates this support at 10 CFR 73.55(b)(2) (eCFR anchor p-73.55(b)(2)).

Only the traced statements above are asserted as source facts. Apply the review to access control, video, intrusion detection, communications, supporting facilities, operators, and documented response paths after confirming that the source and deployed context match.

What the source does not establish

NRC regulation for covered reactors; force-on-force, target sets, response, barriers, and other site details can be sensitive and require authorized review. It does not establish a deployment’s current state, authorize a production change, prove compliance, or show that identity, Windows DNS where used, time, networks, power, life-safety systems, vendors, and monitoring personnel are healthy. Documented options are review inputs, not universal mandates.

Applicability questions

• For source statement 1 at 10 CFR 73.55(e)(10) (eCFR anchor p-73.55(e)(10)), which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?
• For source statement 2 at 10 CFR 73.55(b)(2) (eCFR anchor p-73.55(b)(2)), which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?
• Which owner can attest to the recorded state of access control, video, intrusion detection, communications, supporting facilities, operators, and documented response paths, including exceptions?
• What baseline for identity, Windows DNS where used, time, networks, power, life-safety systems, vendors, and monitoring personnel must accompany the source-specific observation?
• Which success, stop, and escalation criteria are written before testing begins?

DSE recommendation:

DSE recommends using the cited source as the evidence anchor for this decision. Begin by recording scope and current state before deciding whether a change is warranted. Record the source location, examined part of access control, video, intrusion detection, communications, supporting facilities, operators, and documented response paths, observed and expected states, owner, and reason for deviation.

For an approved change, define prerequisites, a limited test path, success and stop conditions, monitoring, and rollback. Check identity, Windows DNS where used, time, networks, power, life-safety systems, vendors, and monitoring personnel in design order. Protect credentials, keys, recovery material, personal data, and sensitive topology in evidence.

Verification and evidence

Tie each conclusion back to 10 CFR 73.55(e)(10) (eCFR anchor p-73.55(e)(10)); 10 CFR 73.55(b)(2) (eCFR anchor p-73.55(b)(2)) and to observable material such as asset and firmware inventories, configuration exports, event tests, inspections, alarm response records, and maintenance findings. Preserve provenance and stable identifiers without copying secrets into the evidence set.

Record the decision even when no change is made, including uncertainty and the next trigger. Use safe testing conditions for disruptive work, preserve rollback proof, and revisit the conclusion after relevant platform, dependency, vendor, or ownership changes.

Official references

• 10 CFR 73.55 – Nuclear power reactor physical protection — U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission via eCFR