Keep an airport security coordinator available and accountable for TSA coordination

Keep this document to one review outcome: Keep an airport security coordinator available and accountable for TSA coordination. Only the official source and traced locations below supply facts. Confirm applicability before acting.

Source fact:

The official 49 CFR 1542.3 — Airport Security from Transportation Security Administration via eCFR supports the following bounded statements:

• Under 49 CFR 1542, the rule requires that each airport operator designate one or more Airport Security Coordinator(s) (ASC) in its security program. The research record locates this support at 49 CFR 1542.3(a) (eCFR anchor p-1542.3(a)).
• Under 49 CFR 1542, any individual designated as an ASC may perform other duties in addition to those described in this paragraph (b). The research record locates this support at 49 CFR 1542.3(b)(1) (eCFR anchor p-1542.3(b)(1)).

The source support ends with the statements listed above. Use them to examine access control, video, intrusion detection, communications, supporting facilities, operators, and documented response paths in the applicable environment, not to imply a wider guarantee.

What the source does not establish

Applies only to airport operators, tenants, personnel, and areas covered by 49 CFR part 1542 and the cited section. Confirm the TSA-approved security program and current directives; this is not legal advice or a universal access-control standard. The citation is not a substitute for observed state, authorization, compliance evidence, or dependency health. Examine identity, Windows DNS where used, time, networks, power, life-safety systems, vendors, and monitoring personnel before translating the source into an operational decision.

Applicability questions

• For source statement 1 at 49 CFR 1542.3(a) (eCFR anchor p-1542.3(a)), which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?
• For source statement 2 at 49 CFR 1542.3(b)(1) (eCFR anchor p-1542.3(b)(1)), which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?
• Which owner can attest to the recorded state of access control, video, intrusion detection, communications, supporting facilities, operators, and documented response paths, including exceptions?
• What baseline for identity, Windows DNS where used, time, networks, power, life-safety systems, vendors, and monitoring personnel must accompany the source-specific observation?
• Which success, stop, and escalation criteria are written before testing begins?

DSE recommendation:

DSE recommends using the cited source as the evidence anchor for this decision. Make the source, asset scope, owner, and expected outcome explicit in the review record. Record the source location, examined part of access control, video, intrusion detection, communications, supporting facilities, operators, and documented response paths, observed and expected states, owner, and reason for deviation.

If the review warrants change, use a bounded implementation with prerequisites, test population, monitoring, abort criteria, and a rehearsed reversal. Sequence checks for identity, Windows DNS where used, time, networks, power, life-safety systems, vendors, and monitoring personnel and sanitize protected material before retention.

Verification and evidence

Build a reproducible chain from 49 CFR 1542.3(a) (eCFR anchor p-1542.3(a)); 49 CFR 1542.3(b)(1) (eCFR anchor p-1542.3(b)(1)) to the observed environment. Useful domain evidence includes asset and firmware inventories, configuration exports, event tests, inspections, alarm response records, and maintenance findings; label every item with scope, timestamp, collector, and stable identifier.

Preserve both successful and failed observations, along with approval and rollback evidence. Avoid uncontrolled production experiments. Assign an expiry or event-driven recheck so the conclusion is not treated as permanent.

Official references

• 49 CFR 1542.3 — Airport Security — Transportation Security Administration via eCFR