Keep VPN identity enrichment on sensor v2 and validate RADIUS accounting data

Treat this document as a focused evidence review: Keep VPN identity enrichment on sensor v2 and validate RADIUS accounting data. Only the official source and traced locations below supply facts. Confirm applicability before acting.

Source fact:

The official Defender for Identity VPN integration in Microsoft Defender from Microsoft supports the following bounded statements:

• Defender for Identity VPN integration is supported only by sensor v2.x. The research record locates this support at Opening applicability statement.
• The integration listens to forwarded RADIUS accounting events and can add connection IP address and location context plus an abnormal-VPN-connection detection. The research record locates this support at VPN data and investigation description.

Do not import neighboring assumptions into the source record. The supported task is a scoped comparison involving identity sensors, connected directories, cloud security services, event flows, roles, alerts, and investigation handoffs and the conditions the source actually describes.

What the source does not establish

The source says the integration is unsupported in FIPS environments; RADIUS location is context, not proof of a user’s physical presence. The citation is not a substitute for observed state, authorization, compliance evidence, or dependency health. Examine Active Directory, Windows DNS, time, certificates, cloud identity, endpoint telemetry, network paths, and security operations before translating the source into an operational decision.

Applicability questions

• For source statement 1 at Opening applicability statement, which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?
• For source statement 2 at VPN data and investigation description, which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?
• Which deployed instance of identity sensors, connected directories, cloud security services, event flows, roles, alerts, and investigation handoffs will be compared with the source, and why that instance?
• How will the review distinguish a source mismatch from a failure in Active Directory, Windows DNS, time, certificates, cloud identity, endpoint telemetry, network paths, and security operations?
• Who approves the conclusion, exception, test window, and rollback threshold?

DSE recommendation:

DSE recommends using the cited source as the evidence anchor for this decision. Use a two-person review for the source interpretation and the resulting operational decision. Record the source location, examined part of identity sensors, connected directories, cloud security services, event flows, roles, alerts, and investigation handoffs, observed and expected states, owner, and reason for deviation.

An implementation decision needs an owner, approved window, prechecks, observable outcome, stop authority, and rollback path. Validate Active Directory, Windows DNS, time, certificates, cloud identity, endpoint telemetry, network paths, and security operations before and after the test, and store only sanitized operational evidence.

Verification and evidence

Build a reproducible chain from Opening applicability statement; VPN data and investigation description to the observed environment. Useful domain evidence includes integration configuration, connectivity tests, event timestamps, alert correlation, role assignments, and case records; label every item with scope, timestamp, collector, and stable identifier.

Record the decision even when no change is made, including uncertainty and the next trigger. Use safe testing conditions for disruptive work, preserve rollback proof, and revisit the conclusion after relevant platform, dependency, vendor, or ownership changes.

Official references

• Defender for Identity VPN integration in Microsoft Defender — Microsoft