Limit Zero Trust DNS pilots to licensed Windows 11 Enterprise or Education devices

Use this document to connect an official requirement or behavior to observable evidence: Limit Zero Trust DNS pilots to licensed Windows 11 Enterprise or Education devices. Only the official source and traced locations below supply facts. Confirm applicability before acting.

Source fact:

The official Zero Trust DNS from Microsoft supports the following bounded statements:

• Zero Trust DNS uses a deny-by-default outbound model; traffic is allowed when its destination came from the trusted resolver or an administrator placed it on the approved list. The research record locates this support at Overview.
• Zero Trust DNS is supported on Windows 11 Enterprise and Education, not Home or Pro, with entitlements from Windows Enterprise E3 or E5 and Windows Education A3 or A5. The research record locates this support at Windows edition and licensing requirements > edition and entitlement tables.

Only the traced statements above are asserted as source facts. Apply the review to Windows security controls, protected identities, audit policy, telemetry, exclusions, administrative roles, and response workflows after confirming that the source and deployed context match.

What the source does not establish

The page applies only to Windows 11 with the listed edition and license; inventory literal-IP, bootstrap, VPN, discovery, and emergency paths before a deny-by-default pilot. It does not establish a deployment’s current state, authorize a production change, prove compliance, or show that Active Directory, Windows DNS, certificate trust, time, endpoint management, telemetry pipelines, and security operations are healthy. Documented options are review inputs, not universal mandates.

Applicability questions

• For source statement 1 at Overview, which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?
• For source statement 2 at Windows edition and licensing requirements > edition and entitlement tables, which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?
• Which deployed instance of Windows security controls, protected identities, audit policy, telemetry, exclusions, administrative roles, and response workflows will be compared with the source, and why that instance?
• How will the review distinguish a source mismatch from a failure in Active Directory, Windows DNS, certificate trust, time, endpoint management, telemetry pipelines, and security operations?
• Who approves the conclusion, exception, test window, and rollback threshold?

DSE recommendation:

DSE recommends using the cited source as the evidence anchor for this decision. Begin by recording scope and current state before deciding whether a change is warranted. Record the source location, examined part of Windows security controls, protected identities, audit policy, telemetry, exclusions, administrative roles, and response workflows, observed and expected states, owner, and reason for deviation.

An implementation decision needs an owner, approved window, prechecks, observable outcome, stop authority, and rollback path. Validate Active Directory, Windows DNS, certificate trust, time, endpoint management, telemetry pipelines, and security operations before and after the test, and store only sanitized operational evidence.

Verification and evidence

A reviewer should be able to retrace the decision from Overview; Windows edition and licensing requirements > edition and entitlement tables through policy and feature state, security events, test detections, administrative assignments, exception approvals, and response tickets. Record what was collected, where, when, by whom, and which system or role it represents.

Retain the starting state, authorization, execution record, outcome, deviation, and final state as one review package. Move disruptive checks to an approved test path. Reopen the decision when versions, design, dependencies, ownership, or official guidance changes.

Official references

• Zero Trust DNS — Microsoft