Reject authoritative implementations that mishandle AAAA query responses

Use RFC 4074 — Common Misbehavior Against DNS Queries for IPv6 Addresses to review this narrow operational decision without extending the source beyond its stated scope.

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Executive summary

What you need to know

Use RFC 4074 — Common Misbehavior Against DNS Queries for IPv6 Addresses to review this narrow operational decision without extending the source beyond its stated scope.

Potentially affected

Teams, systems, services, or facilities within the stated scope of RFC 4074 — Common Misbehavior Against DNS Queries for IPv6 Addresses

DSE recommendation

Compare the observed state with the cited official source, document applicability and exceptions, and test any approved change with rollback safeguards.

Keep this document to one review outcome: Reject authoritative implementations that mishandle AAAA query responses. Only the official source and traced locations below supply facts. Confirm applicability before acting.

Source fact:

The official RFC 4074 — Common Misbehavior Against DNS Queries for IPv6 Addresses from RFC Editor / Internet Engineering Task Force supports the following bounded statements:

  • For an existing name that has no AAAA record, an authoritative server should return NOERROR with an empty answer rather than NXDOMAIN. The research record locates this support at Section 3 (Expected Behavior).
  • Returning NXDOMAIN to an AAAA query incorrectly asserts that the queried name does not exist, not merely that its AAAA record is absent. The research record locates this support at Section 4.2 (Return Name Error).
  • An authoritative server that omits the AA bit from an empty AAAA response can be treated as lame and cause unnecessary fallback behavior. The research record locates this support at Section 4.5 (Do Not Return an Authoritative Answer).

Only the traced statements above are asserted as source facts. Apply the review to authoritative zones, delegations, resolvers, caches, record owners, and the clients that consume the resulting answers after confirming that the source and deployed context match.

What the source does not establish

This RFC evidence supports only the named DNS protocol decision; it does not prove Windows implementation support or a safe production configuration. No current deployment state or change approval follows from the source alone. Validate Windows DNS roles, Active Directory-integrated data, forwarding paths, time, routing, firewalls, and registrar or registry state, and treat examples or options as conditional inputs rather than defaults.

Applicability questions

  • For source statement 1 at Section 3 (Expected Behavior), which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?
  • For source statement 2 at Section 4.2 (Return Name Error), which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?
  • For source statement 3 at Section 4.5 (Do Not Return an Authoritative Answer), which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?
  • Within authoritative zones, delegations, resolvers, caches, record owners, and the clients that consume the resulting answers, which versions, roles, and configuration states define the review population?
  • Could Windows DNS roles, Active Directory-integrated data, forwarding paths, time, routing, firewalls, and registrar or registry state invalidate the test, hide a failure, or change applicability?
  • Who owns the decision, and which observation requires stopping, escalation, or rollback?

DSE recommendation:

DSE recommends using the cited source as the evidence anchor for this decision. Begin by recording scope and current state before deciding whether a change is warranted. Record the source location, examined part of authoritative zones, delegations, resolvers, caches, record owners, and the clients that consume the resulting answers, observed and expected states, owner, and reason for deviation.

For an approved change, define prerequisites, a limited test path, success and stop conditions, monitoring, and rollback. Check Windows DNS roles, Active Directory-integrated data, forwarding paths, time, routing, firewalls, and registrar or registry state in design order. Protect credentials, keys, recovery material, personal data, and sensitive topology in evidence.

Verification and evidence

Build a reproducible chain from Section 3 (Expected Behavior); Section 4.2 (Return Name Error); Section 4.5 (Do Not Return an Authoritative Answer) to the observed environment. Useful domain evidence includes zone data, packet captures, query transcripts, delegation checks, resolver configuration, and negative-answer behavior; label every item with scope, timestamp, collector, and stable identifier.

Retain the starting state, authorization, execution record, outcome, deviation, and final state as one review package. Move disruptive checks to an approved test path. Reopen the decision when versions, design, dependencies, ownership, or official guidance changes.

Official references

Primary reference

Review the official source

RFC 4074 — Common Misbehavior Against DNS Queries for IPv6 Addresses · Verified August 26, 2026

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