Treat standalone Defender for Identity sensor coverage as limited without ETW

Use this document to connect an official requirement or behavior to observable evidence: Treat standalone Defender for Identity sensor coverage as limited without ETW. Only the official source and traced locations below supply facts. Confirm applicability before acting.

Source fact:

The official Microsoft Defender for Identity standalone sensor prerequisites from Microsoft supports the following bounded statements:

• The page defines prerequisite differences for a standalone sensor relative to the main deployment prerequisites. The research record locates this support at Opening applicability statement.
• Standalone sensors do not collect ETW entries used by multiple detections, so Microsoft recommends the standard Defender for Identity sensor for full coverage. The research record locates this support at Coverage limitation paragraph.

These statements are the factual basis for this document. Do not extend them into a broader assurance. Review Defender for Identity workspaces, sensors, directory-service accounts, action accounts, network paths, roles, and deployment health only where the source and recorded environment align.

What the source does not establish

A standalone sensor can supplement approved designs, but the page explicitly does not establish equivalent detection coverage. No current deployment state or change approval follows from the source alone. Validate Active Directory, Windows DNS, time, certificates, domain-controller resources, network capture, cloud connectivity, and security operations, and treat examples or options as conditional inputs rather than defaults.

Applicability questions

• For source statement 1 at Opening applicability statement, which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?
• For source statement 2 at Coverage limitation paragraph, which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?
• Which deployed instance of Defender for Identity workspaces, sensors, directory-service accounts, action accounts, network paths, roles, and deployment health will be compared with the source, and why that instance?
• How will the review distinguish a source mismatch from a failure in Active Directory, Windows DNS, time, certificates, domain-controller resources, network capture, cloud connectivity, and security operations?
• Who approves the conclusion, exception, test window, and rollback threshold?

DSE recommendation:

DSE recommends using the cited source as the evidence anchor for this decision. Start with applicability, then compare the observed state with the cited source. Record the source location, examined part of Defender for Identity workspaces, sensors, directory-service accounts, action accounts, network paths, roles, and deployment health, observed and expected states, owner, and reason for deviation.

Do not move from citation to production in one step. Pilot the decision where practical, observe agreed signals, retain a reversal point, and verify Active Directory, Windows DNS, time, certificates, domain-controller resources, network capture, cloud connectivity, and security operations. Handle credentials, keys, recovery data, and personal information through approved secure channels.

Verification and evidence

Keep the source locations Opening applicability statement; Coverage limitation paragraph adjacent to the sanitized artifacts used for comparison. Prefer sensor inventory, service and action-account permissions, health alerts, connectivity tests, portal state, and controlled detection tests, with enough identity and timing data for an independent recheck.

Retain the starting state, authorization, execution record, outcome, deviation, and final state as one review package. Move disruptive checks to an approved test path. Reopen the decision when versions, design, dependencies, ownership, or official guidance changes.

Official references

• Microsoft Defender for Identity standalone sensor prerequisites — Microsoft