Use a gMSA only for Defender for Identity sensor v2 directory reads

Treat this document as a focused evidence review: Use a gMSA only for Defender for Identity sensor v2 directory reads. Only the official source and traced locations below supply facts. Confirm applicability before acting.

Source fact:

The official Configure a gMSA directory service account for Defender for Identity from Microsoft supports the following bounded statements:

• The documented gMSA is for sensor v2.x to read Active Directory data such as objects, changes, and entity information. The research record locates this support at Opening overview.
• Sensor v3.x uses LocalSystem for Active Directory interactions and does not require a gMSA or other Directory Service Account. The research record locates this support at Version applicability paragraph.

These statements are the factual basis for this document. Do not extend them into a broader assurance. Review Defender for Identity workspaces, sensors, directory-service accounts, action accounts, network paths, roles, and deployment health only where the source and recorded environment align.

What the source does not establish

This gMSA is not the remediation action account and should not be granted those permissions. No current deployment state or change approval follows from the source alone. Validate Active Directory, Windows DNS, time, certificates, domain-controller resources, network capture, cloud connectivity, and security operations, and treat examples or options as conditional inputs rather than defaults.

Applicability questions

• For source statement 1 at Opening overview, which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?
• For source statement 2 at Version applicability paragraph, which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?
• Which deployed instance of Defender for Identity workspaces, sensors, directory-service accounts, action accounts, network paths, roles, and deployment health will be compared with the source, and why that instance?
• How will the review distinguish a source mismatch from a failure in Active Directory, Windows DNS, time, certificates, domain-controller resources, network capture, cloud connectivity, and security operations?
• Who approves the conclusion, exception, test window, and rollback threshold?

DSE recommendation:

DSE recommends using the cited source as the evidence anchor for this decision. Start with applicability, then compare the observed state with the cited source. Record the source location, examined part of Defender for Identity workspaces, sensors, directory-service accounts, action accounts, network paths, roles, and deployment health, observed and expected states, owner, and reason for deviation.

Translate the conclusion into change control only after documenting dependencies, impact, test method, expected signals, failure signals, and restoration steps. Include Active Directory, Windows DNS, time, certificates, domain-controller resources, network capture, cloud connectivity, and security operations, while excluding secrets and sensitive personal or topology data from ordinary tickets.

Verification and evidence

Keep the source locations Opening overview; Version applicability paragraph adjacent to the sanitized artifacts used for comparison. Prefer sensor inventory, service and action-account permissions, health alerts, connectivity tests, portal state, and controlled detection tests, with enough identity and timing data for an independent recheck.

Record the decision even when no change is made, including uncertainty and the next trigger. Use safe testing conditions for disruptive work, preserve rollback proof, and revisit the conclusion after relevant platform, dependency, vendor, or ownership changes.

Official references

• Configure a gMSA directory service account for Defender for Identity — Microsoft