Exempt Defender for Identity sensor traffic from SSL interception

Use this document to resolve one bounded operational decision: Exempt Defender for Identity sensor traffic from SSL interception. Only the official source and traced locations below supply facts. Confirm applicability before acting.

Source fact:

The official Connect to the Defender for Identity service from Microsoft supports the following bounded statements:

• Each Defender for Identity sensor requires internet connectivity to the cloud service to report data and operate. The research record locates this support at Opening overview.
• SSL inspection and intercepting proxies are unsupported because they interfere with certificate-based mutual authentication; proxy traffic must pass to required service URLs without interception. The research record locates this support at Proxy and authentication explanation.

Do not import neighboring assumptions into the source record. The supported task is a scoped comparison involving Defender for Identity workspaces, sensors, directory-service accounts, action accounts, network paths, roles, and deployment health and the conditions the source actually describes.

What the source does not establish

Allow only the documented service destinations and validate change controls; this source does not define an organization-wide proxy bypass policy. It does not establish a deployment’s current state, authorize a production change, prove compliance, or show that Active Directory, Windows DNS, time, certificates, domain-controller resources, network capture, cloud connectivity, and security operations are healthy. Documented options are review inputs, not universal mandates.

Applicability questions

• For source statement 1 at Opening overview, which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?
• For source statement 2 at Proxy and authentication explanation, which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?
• Which deployed instance of Defender for Identity workspaces, sensors, directory-service accounts, action accounts, network paths, roles, and deployment health will be compared with the source, and why that instance?
• How will the review distinguish a source mismatch from a failure in Active Directory, Windows DNS, time, certificates, domain-controller resources, network capture, cloud connectivity, and security operations?
• Who approves the conclusion, exception, test window, and rollback threshold?

DSE recommendation:

DSE recommends using the cited source as the evidence anchor for this decision. Use a two-person review for the source interpretation and the resulting operational decision. Record the source location, examined part of Defender for Identity workspaces, sensors, directory-service accounts, action accounts, network paths, roles, and deployment health, observed and expected states, owner, and reason for deviation.

For an approved change, define prerequisites, a limited test path, success and stop conditions, monitoring, and rollback. Check Active Directory, Windows DNS, time, certificates, domain-controller resources, network capture, cloud connectivity, and security operations in design order. Protect credentials, keys, recovery material, personal data, and sensitive topology in evidence.

Verification and evidence

Build a reproducible chain from Opening overview; Proxy and authentication explanation to the observed environment. Useful domain evidence includes sensor inventory, service and action-account permissions, health alerts, connectivity tests, portal state, and controlled detection tests; label every item with scope, timestamp, collector, and stable identifier.

Retain the starting state, authorization, execution record, outcome, deviation, and final state as one review package. Move disruptive checks to an approved test path. Reopen the decision when versions, design, dependencies, ownership, or official guidance changes.

Official references

• Connect to the Defender for Identity service — Microsoft