Set qualification, training, and conduct standards for airport law-enforcement personnel

Use 49 CFR 1542.217 -- Airport Security to review this narrow operational decision without extending the source beyond its stated scope.

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Executive summary

What you need to know

Use 49 CFR 1542.217 -- Airport Security to review this narrow operational decision without extending the source beyond its stated scope.

Potentially affected

Teams, systems, services, or facilities within the stated scope of 49 CFR 1542.217 -- Airport Security

DSE recommendation

Compare the observed state with the cited official source, document applicability and exceptions, and test any approved change with rollback safeguards.

Keep this document to one review outcome: Set qualification, training, and conduct standards for airport law-enforcement personnel. Only the official source and traced locations below supply facts. Confirm applicability before acting.

Source fact:

The official 49 CFR 1542.217 — Airport Security from Transportation Security Administration via eCFR supports the following bounded statements:

  • Under 49 CFR 1542, law-enforcement personnel used to meet section 1542.215 must be armed with a firearm and authorized to use it while on duty at the airport. The research record locates this support at 49 CFR 1542.217(a)(3), read with 49 CFR 1542.217(a) (eCFR anchor p-1542.217(a)(3)).
  • Under 49 CFR 1542, when State and local jurisdictions lack qualifying private-law-enforcement training standards, the airport training program must specify TSA-acceptable standards. The research record locates this support at 49 CFR 1542.217(c)(2), read with 49 CFR 1542.217(c) (eCFR anchor p-1542.217(c)(2)).

Only the traced statements above are asserted as source facts. Apply the review to access control, video, intrusion detection, communications, supporting facilities, operators, and documented response paths after confirming that the source and deployed context match.

What the source does not establish

Applies only to airport operators, tenants, personnel, and areas covered by 49 CFR part 1542 and the cited section. Confirm the TSA-approved security program and current directives; this is not legal advice or a universal access-control standard. Do not read the source as proof of implementation or permission to change production. Its guidance remains conditional on identity, Windows DNS where used, time, networks, power, life-safety systems, vendors, and monitoring personnel and the environment’s recorded constraints.

Applicability questions

  • For source statement 1 at 49 CFR 1542.217(a)(3), read with 49 CFR 1542.217(a) (eCFR anchor p-1542.217(a)(3)), which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?
  • For source statement 2 at 49 CFR 1542.217(c)(2), read with 49 CFR 1542.217(c) (eCFR anchor p-1542.217(c)(2)), which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?
  • Which owner can attest to the recorded state of access control, video, intrusion detection, communications, supporting facilities, operators, and documented response paths, including exceptions?
  • What baseline for identity, Windows DNS where used, time, networks, power, life-safety systems, vendors, and monitoring personnel must accompany the source-specific observation?
  • Which success, stop, and escalation criteria are written before testing begins?

DSE recommendation:

DSE recommends using the cited source as the evidence anchor for this decision. Begin by recording scope and current state before deciding whether a change is warranted. Record the source location, examined part of access control, video, intrusion detection, communications, supporting facilities, operators, and documented response paths, observed and expected states, owner, and reason for deviation.

Translate the conclusion into change control only after documenting dependencies, impact, test method, expected signals, failure signals, and restoration steps. Include identity, Windows DNS where used, time, networks, power, life-safety systems, vendors, and monitoring personnel, while excluding secrets and sensitive personal or topology data from ordinary tickets.

Verification and evidence

Tie each conclusion back to 49 CFR 1542.217(a)(3), read with 49 CFR 1542.217(a) (eCFR anchor p-1542.217(a)(3)); 49 CFR 1542.217(c)(2), read with 49 CFR 1542.217(c) (eCFR anchor p-1542.217(c)(2)) and to observable material such as asset and firmware inventories, configuration exports, event tests, inspections, alarm response records, and maintenance findings. Preserve provenance and stable identifiers without copying secrets into the evidence set.

Retain the starting state, authorization, execution record, outcome, deviation, and final state as one review package. Move disruptive checks to an approved test path. Reopen the decision when versions, design, dependencies, ownership, or official guidance changes.

Official references

Primary reference

Review the official source

49 CFR 1542.217 -- Airport Security · Verified August 26, 2026

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