Keep RDP credentials off the target with Remote Credential Guard

Use this document to connect an official requirement or behavior to observable evidence: Keep RDP credentials off the target with Remote Credential Guard. Only the official source and traced locations below supply facts. Confirm applicability before acting.

Source fact:

The official Remote Credential Guard from Microsoft supports the following bounded statements:

• Remote Credential Guard redirects Kerberos requests to the originating device instead of sending credentials to the RDP target. The research record locates this support at Opening overview.
• It protects credentials and derivatives from a compromised target while retaining Remote Desktop single sign-on. The research record locates this support at Opening overview.

Keep the evidence boundary at these traced claims. They support a review of Windows security controls, protected identities, audit policy, telemetry, exclusions, administrative roles, and response workflows; they do not support conclusions outside the source’s stated conditions.

What the source does not establish

Confirm OS, domain, Kerberos, delegation, and client requirements before requiring it. It does not establish a deployment’s current state, authorize a production change, prove compliance, or show that Active Directory, Windows DNS, certificate trust, time, endpoint management, telemetry pipelines, and security operations are healthy. Documented options are review inputs, not universal mandates.

Applicability questions

• For source statement 1 at Opening overview, which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?
• For source statement 2 at Opening overview, which observable configuration, record, or test can confirm applicability here?
• Which deployed instance of Windows security controls, protected identities, audit policy, telemetry, exclusions, administrative roles, and response workflows will be compared with the source, and why that instance?
• How will the review distinguish a source mismatch from a failure in Active Directory, Windows DNS, certificate trust, time, endpoint management, telemetry pipelines, and security operations?
• Who approves the conclusion, exception, test window, and rollback threshold?

DSE recommendation:

DSE recommends using the cited source as the evidence anchor for this decision. Anchor the review in the cited section and keep observation separate from interpretation. Record the source location, examined part of Windows security controls, protected identities, audit policy, telemetry, exclusions, administrative roles, and response workflows, observed and expected states, owner, and reason for deviation.

An implementation decision needs an owner, approved window, prechecks, observable outcome, stop authority, and rollback path. Validate Active Directory, Windows DNS, certificate trust, time, endpoint management, telemetry pipelines, and security operations before and after the test, and store only sanitized operational evidence.

Verification and evidence

Tie each conclusion back to Opening overview; Opening overview and to observable material such as policy and feature state, security events, test detections, administrative assignments, exception approvals, and response tickets. Preserve provenance and stable identifiers without copying secrets into the evidence set.

Preserve both successful and failed observations, along with approval and rollback evidence. Avoid uncontrolled production experiments. Assign an expiry or event-driven recheck so the conclusion is not treated as permanent.

Official references

• Remote Credential Guard — Microsoft