Page 152 of the DSE Cybersecurity knowledge center, with source-backed guidance and practical next steps.
Source-backed guidance for identity, vulnerability reduction, ransomware readiness, detection, response, and recovery.
Under 10 CFR 73, the rule requires that the licensee protect digital computer and communication systems and networks associated with: support systems and equipment which, if compromised, would adversely impact safety, security, or emergency preparedness functions.
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Under 10 CFR 73, consistent with the physical protection program design requirements of section 73.55(b), and in accordance with the site-specific analysis, the licensee must establish and maintain vehicle control measures, as necessary, to protect against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage vehicle bomb assault.
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Under 10 CFR 73, any individual who is applying for unescorted access or unescorted access authorization must disclose the personal history information that is required by the licensee’s or applicant’s access authorization program…
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Under 10 CFR 73, except those listed in paragraph (b)(2) of this section, each licensee subject to the provisions of this section must fingerprint each individual who is permitted unescorted access to the nuclear power facility, the non-power reactor facility in accordance with paragraph (g) of this section, or access to Safeguards Information.
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Under 10 CFR 73, the rule requires that the licensee assess and manage the potential for adverse effects on safety and security, including the site emergency plan, before implementing changes to plant configurations, facility conditions, or security.
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Under 10 CFR 73, the rule requires that intrusion alarms, physical barriers, and other devices used for material protection be maintained in operable condition.
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Under 10 CFR 73, each licensee who possesses, uses or transports special nuclear material of moderate or low strategic significance must establish and maintain a physical protection system that will achieve the following objectives: facilitate the location and recovery of missing special nuclear material.
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Under 10 CFR 73, the rule requires that the licensee retain the documentation for these events for three years from the date of documenting each event.
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Under 10 CFR 73, a licensee who conducts an on-site transfer of spent nuclear fuel that does not travel upon or cross a public highway is exempt from the requirements of this section for that transfer.
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Under 10 CFR 73, the rule requires that a licensee authorized to export special nuclear material of low strategic significance notify in writing the Director, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, by email (preferred method) to AdvanceNotifications.Resource@nrc.gov or by using any appropriate method listed in section 73.4.
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